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 The Supreme Court’s Understanding 
of the Democratic Self-Government, 
Advancement of Truth and 
Knowledge and Individual Self-
Realization Rationales for Protecting 
Freedom of Expression: Part I — 
Taking Stock 
Robin Elliot 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of Canada has explained Canada’s commitment 
to freedom of expression in section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms1 on the basis of the importance Canadians attach to 
three deeper societal values — democratic self-government, the ad-
vancement of truth and knowledge and individual self-realization. These 
values, in other words, have been said by the Court to provide the 
philosophical rationales for providing constitutional protection to free-
dom of expression in this country. But it is clear from the Court’s section 
2(b) jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point that these values have 
                                                                                                             
 Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. The author is grateful to Bill Black,  
Susan Chapman, Michael Elliot and Margot Young for their many helpful comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper. He is also grateful to his research assistant, Laura DeVries, for the significant 
contribution she made to its preparation, in particular by reviewing all of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s judgments on freedom of expression since the advent of the Charter with an eye to finding 
passages in which the Court commented on one or more of the rationales. He is also grateful to his 
other research assistant, Brad Por, for help with the footnoting. The author very much appreciates the 
funding support for this project that he received from The Foundation for Legal Research. Any 
errors the paper is found to contain are the sole responsibility of the author. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. The full text of s. 2(b) reads as follows: “2. Everyone has … (b) 
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media 
of communication.” 
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come to do more than that. They have also come to play important 
doctrinal roles. In the more significant of those roles, the values assist the 
Court to resolve challenges to government action based on section 2(b). 
But the values have also been used by the Court to assist it in resolving a 
narrow range of common law and statute-based cases in which freedom 
of expression is implicated.  
Insofar as the first category of cases is concerned, those in which 
section 2(b) is used to challenge the constitutionality of government 
action, the values feature in all three of the analytical stages through 
which such a challenge can potentially proceed. In respect of some 
challenges, the Court has told us, that role will be to aid in determining 
whether or not the prohibited or regulated expressive activity in question 
comes within the sphere of protection afforded by section 2(b).2 In 
respect of others, that role will be to help in determining whether the 
impugned governmental action infringes on an interest that is known, or 
has been held, to be protected by section 2(b).3 And in respect of still 
others — all those in which the government is called upon to justify 
under section 1 of the Charter an infringement of section 2(b) — that role 
will be to assist the reviewing court to determine whether or not that 
justification has been made out.4 Insofar as the second, and much 
smaller, category of cases is concerned, the more settled doctrinal role is 
played in cases in which the Court is asked to change part of the common 
law to better reflect the importance that section 2(b)’s presence in the 
Charter requires us to attach to freedom of expression.5 There is also 
evidence, albeit very limited, of the values playing a role in cases in 
which the Court is asked to factor freedom of expression interests into 
the application of statutory provisions.6 
Some of these doctrinal roles have been in place since the late 
1980’s, notably those relating to the finding of infringements and the 
application of section 1. However, the majority of them have come into 
being in recent years, and it is not unreasonable to infer from the juris-
prudential record that the current Court has a genuine, and growing, 
                                                                                                             
2 See text accompanying notes 59 to 72. It is worth noting here that the values play no role 
in determining whether or not the content of particular messages is protected by s. 2(b); the Court 
has taken the position that all non-violent attempts to convey meaning are protected regardless of 
content. 
3 See text accompanying notes 73 to 78. 
4 See text accompanying notes 79 to 89. 
5 See text accompanying notes 90 to 93. 
6 See text accompanying notes 94 to 96. 
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fondness for using the values as analytical tools in cases in which section 
2(b) is invoked. That is especially true of Chief Justice McLachlin, who, 
as we will see, has authored or co-authored a number of the leading 
judgments. Whether or not that fondness translates into the addition of 
new such roles, one can, I think, say that use of the values as analytical 
tools has now become an established feature of the Court’s approach to 
freedom of expression. As such, the values are appropriate subjects for 
scholarly attention. And that is particularly the case with respect to the 
understandings that the Court has developed of them, for it is on the basis 
of those understandings that the actual implementation of the doctrinal 
roles that the values have been assigned depends. 
Important as these three values have become to the resolution of 
cases in which section 2(b) is invoked, it must be said that, at least to this 
point, the Court has provided very little in the way of guidance on the 
general conceptions of the values that inform its application of them. 
That paucity of guidance can be attributed in part to the limited number 
of cases in which the Court has been called upon to give effect to some 
of the doctrinal roles, notably those that bear on the questions of whether 
or not the prohibited or regulated expressive activity in question comes 
within the sphere of protection afforded by section 2(b), and whether or 
not the impugned governmental action infringes on an interest that is 
known, or has been held, to be protected by section 2(b). However, the 
Court has had numerous opportunities to consider the scope and meaning 
of the values at the section 1 stage of cases, particularly in cases in which 
it has had to deal with attacks on legislation that limits freedom of 
expression because of a concern by government about the potentially 
harmful effects of the content of particular messages — commercial 
advertising,7 obscenity,8 hate propaganda,9 child pornography,10 and so 
on. Regrettably, the Court has very rarely engaged in a careful and 
                                                                                                             
7 See, e.g., Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 
S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”]; RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 
68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “RJR”]; and Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-
Macdonald Corp., [2007] S.C.J. No. 30, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canada v. JTI-
Macdonald”]. 
8 See, e.g., R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Butler”], and Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No. 
66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Sisters”]. 
9 See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Keegstra”] and Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 
S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taylor”]. 
10 See R. v. Sharpe, [2000] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (S.C.C.) [“hereinafter 
“Sharpe”]. 
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considered analysis of any of the values at that stage. In most cases in 
which the values have factored into the analysis, in fact, the Court’s 
treatment of them has tended to be perfunctory.  
Why that is so is far from clear. Whatever the reason, it means that we 
lack the kind of explicit comprehensive guidance we might have hoped for 
by now on this important aspect of the Court’s approach to freedom of 
expression. However, it does not mean that we are entirely without guid-
ance. In fact, as we will see, by combining together the random bits and 
pieces of insights into the Court’s thinking about the rationales that we can 
extract from the many judgments in which the Court has commented on one 
or more of them, we can construct a reasonably detailed — if not entirely 
coherent — picture of its understanding of each of them. 
Defining the reach of each of these three values is not, it must be 
said, an easy task.11 On the contrary, it is a very difficult one, and, if the 
Court were prepared to undertake it, would require the Court to consider 
and resolve a number of challenging issues. The reach of democratic 
self-government, for example, would depend on the specific elements of 
democracy that are seen by the Court to comprise that value, and to 
comprise it, it is important to note, not in some general theoretical sense, 
but in the context of section 2(b) of the Charter, the provision designed to 
protect freedom of expression in the constitution of a specific country, 
Canada, that has a particular history and set of constitutional and political 
traditions. The ability to criticize the government of the day, its policies 
and those who represent it would be covered under any plausible concep-
tion of that value. So, too, would the ability to express one’s views for 
and against political parties and their candidates, and more generally on 
matters of public importance, both during and between elections. But 
what about the ability to criticize the courts and other bodies that perform 
adjudicative functions? And what about the ability to make donations to 
political parties, particularly on the part of large corporations and trade 
unions; the ability to publish the potentially misleading results of polls 
close to, or even on, the date of an election; and the ability to publicize 
the results of a federal election in parts of the country in which the polls 
have closed to people residing in parts of the country in which they 
remain open? What about the ability to use deliberate falsehoods in the 
course of a political debate? What role, if any, does the principle of 
                                                                                                             
11 For another, much earlier and much more detailed discussion of the challenging interpre-
tive issues raised by these values, see Richard Moon, “The Scope of Freedom of Expression” (1985) 
23 Osgoode Hall L.J. 331, at 332-33 and 335-46 [hereinafter “Moon, ‘The Scope of Freedom of 
Expression’”] (although he limits himself to the first and third values only). 
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equality play in the fashioning of a democratic system of government for 
this purpose? What about a much broader conception of democracy, one 
which accommodates not only the institutional trappings of self-
government, but reaches out to include respect for individual autonomy 
and human dignity and a well-informed and publicly minded citizenry? 
Similar challenges exist in relation to the other two values, the ad-
vancement of truth and knowledge and individual self-realization. While 
the meaning of truth and knowledge may be clear enough, what kinds of 
expression can be said to contribute to their advancement? Do the 
creative arts do so? Does obscene material? Do purely private communi-
cations? Are assertions of fact to be treated differently from statements of 
opinion, and if so, on what basis and in what respects? Does the ad-
vancement of truth and knowledge depend on people responding ration-
ally to the statements of opinion and assertions of fact that enter the 
“marketplace of ideas”? If it does, how does a court evaluate the extent 
to which people will, or will not, respond rationally? What is the appro-
priate response from a court that concludes that people’s responses to a 
particular kind of expression will be mixed, with some responding 
rationally and other not? To what extent does the advancement of truth 
and knowledge depend on participants in the “marketplace of ideas” 
having equal access to it? What role should this value play in circum-
stances in which such equal access is highly unlikely if not impossible?  
What kinds of choices should be protected by individual self-
realization? Should that value be understood in terms of basic autonomy, 
and hence to give constitutional protection to communication bearing 
upon any and all of the choices that an individual could make in what he 
or she perceives to be his or her self-interest — for example, the choice 
between the toy manufactured by company A and the toy manufactured 
by company B, or between Dentist X and Dentist Y? Or should its reach 
be limited to a narrower range of choices, those relating to one’s intellec-
tual, moral and spiritual development? If the broader view is adopted, is 
it possible to value some choices more highly than others, and on that 
basis give greater weight to some kinds of communication than others? Is 
rationality required in the making of a choice in order for that choice — 
and communications bearing on it — to be protected?  
The fact that these values have come to play a variety of doctrinal 
roles in the resolution of section 2(b) cases is a sufficient reason to 
explore the question of what each of them means. But it is not the only 
one. Even if the values remained nothing more than the general philoso-
phical rationales for protecting freedom of expression in a society such 
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as ours, there would be good reason to explore that question. And that is 
true for at least two reasons. The first is that, simply qua philosophical 
rationales, we are entitled to expect the Court to use them as general 
guides in the resolution of section 2(b) cases — as an important part of 
the broader context within which the clash between competing interests 
that is an inevitable feature of cases in which restrictions on freedom of 
expression are under attack has to be considered. We should expect, in 
other words, that the results at which the Court arrives should, in broad 
terms, be consistent with, and explicable in terms of, these values. The 
second reason is that at least the first and third of these values — democ-
ratic self-government and individual self-realization — have significance 
within our legal system well beyond section 2(b) of the Charter. Democ-
ratic self-government, as a constitutional value, is relevant to the resolu-
tion of disputes in a very broad range of areas, including other provisions 
of the Charter, other provisions of the Constitution, administrative law, 
and even statutory interpretation. The same can be said in respect of 
individual self-realization, aspects of which — respect for human dignity 
and autonomy, for example — underpin most if not all of the rights and 
freedoms spelled out in the Charter, and also play a role in the resolution 
of disputes in the areas of criminal law, family law, contract law and tort 
law. However important these three values may or may not be to the 
doctrine the Court uses to help it resolve cases in which section 2(b) is 
invoked, therefore, it is worth our while to devote time and effort to 
thinking carefully about their scope and meaning. 
This paper is intended to contribute to the process of thinking care-
fully about the scope and meaning of these three values. It is essentially 
descriptive in nature, and is intended to put in place the building blocks 
for the normative analysis that follows in a second paper. It puts those 
building blocks in place by extracting from the Court’s existing section 
2(b) jurisprudence its position to this point on three critically important 
issues relating to the place of the three values within the broader frame-
work of its approach to section 2(b). Part II explains how the Court came 
to adopt democratic self-government, the advancement of truth and 
knowledge and individual self-realization as the rationales for protecting 
freedom of expression in the Charter. Part III summarizes the bodies of 
section 2(b) jurisprudence in which these values have come to play the 
doctrinal roles described above, with an eye to clarifying the origins and 
precise nature of each of those roles. That summary provides an impor-
tant part of the jurisprudential context within which the Court’s explora-
tion of the meanings of the three rationales has taken place. And in Part 
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IV, the longest and most important section, the paper attempts to extract 
from these bodies of jurisprudence the meanings the Court has so far 
given to each of the values.  
The second paper will take a critical look at the meanings the Court 
has given to the values. That critique will be informed by the work of one 
of the leading American scholars in the area of freedom of expression, 
Frederick Schauer, and in particular on the views that he expressed on 
the reasons for protecting free speech in his book, Free Speech: A Phi-
losophical Inquiry.12 Not only do those views provide a good example of 
the kind of methodical, careful and dispassionate thinking about the 
values that I believe is necessary, they will also provide a helpful vantage 
point from which to engage in an evaluation of the views the Court has 
been expressing. 
II. ADOPTION OF THE THREE VALUES AS THE RATIONALES FOR 
SECTION 2(b) 
Two years before it rendered its first judgment under section 2(b), the 
Supreme Court adopted an approach to the interpretation and application 
of the rights and freedoms set out in the Charter that entailed careful 
attention being paid to the rationales for protecting them. First enunci-
ated in 1984 in Hunter v. Southam Inc.13 and then fleshed out the follow-
ing year in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,14 this approach, which became 
known as the purposive approach, called for courts to interpret each right 
and freedom in light of the purposes it was intended to further; as Dick-
son C.J.C. put it in the latter case, “The meaning of a right or freedom … 
[is] to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it 
[is] to be understood, in other words, in the light of the interests it was 
meant to protect.”15 In that case, Dickson C.J.C. also identified a number 
of different sources of guidance to which it was appropriate to turn in 
identifying these purposes. Some of these sources, he said, are to be 
found in the Charter itself, while others, notably history and philosophy, 
are extrinsic to it.16 To demonstrate both its commitment to that approach 
and the kind of probing and thoughtful analysis it called for, the Court 
devoted a good deal of time and effort in those two cases to the explora-
                                                                                                             
12 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
13 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). 
14 [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Big M Drug Mart”]. 
15 Id., at 344. 
16 Id. 
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tion of what it considered to be the sources relevant to identifying the 
purposes of the right to be secure against unreasonable search and 
seizure and freedom of religion respectively, and the interpretations it 
gave to those two rights very much reflected the purposes to which those 
explorations led. 
There was every reason to believe, therefore, that a probing and 
thoughtful discussion of the rationales for protecting freedom of expres-
sion would feature prominently in the Court’s resolution of the first section 
2(b) case to come before it. That case, which was decided in 1986, was 
Dolphin Delivery,17 a challenge to the validity of an injunction against 
secondary picketing on the part of a trade union. It would be wrong to 
assert that McIntyre J., who wrote for a majority of the Court in that case, 
paid no heed at all to the question of the rationales for protecting freedom 
of expression in developing his understanding of that right. He noted the 
connection between freedom of expression and democracy,18 and one can 
find indications in some of the quotations he relies on from American and 
pre-Charter Canadian jurisprudence of support for the advancement of 
truth and knowledge and individual self-realization rationales.19 But that is 
the extent of his attention to the issue. He seemed far more interested in 
establishing the historical and jurisprudential pedigree of freedom of 
expression than in exploring the rationales underlying it. Significantly, no 
mention whatsoever is made in his reasons for judgment of the purposive 
approach to interpreting the Charter and there is nothing to suggest that the 
rationales referred to affected in any direct way the Court’s analysis of the 
particular free speech problem it had to resolve in that case. In the result, 
he held that labour picketing was a protected form of expression under 
section 2(b) (albeit a form that, in the circumstances of this case, had been 
justifiably overridden by the impugned injunction). 
The link between freedom of expression and democratic self-
government was noted in the Court’s next two cases in which that right 
was considered, Ontario Public Service Employees’ Union v. Ontario 
(Attorney General)20 and Canadian Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney 
General),21 but no mention was made in either of them of the advance-
ment of truth and knowledge or individual self-realization, and in neither 
                                                                                                             
17 Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 
[1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (S.C.C.). 
18 Id., at 583-86. 
19 Id., at 583. 
20 [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.). 
21 [1988] S.C.J. No. 67, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 122 (S.C.C.). 
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did the Court refer to the purposive approach to interpreting the Charter. 
It was not until the Court decided Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General),22 
that these values were formally adopted as the rationales for protecting 
freedom of expression. That case, a challenge to provisions of Quebec’s 
Charter of the French Language23 requiring all outdoor commercial 
signs in that province to be in the French language only, raised two 
important issues relating to the meaning and scope of section 2(b), both 
of which the Court answered in the affirmative. One was whether or not 
freedom of expression protected the right to choose the language in 
which one expresses oneself; the other was whether or not it protected 
commercial expression. The Court did not make reference to any of the 
three values as such in support of its affirmative answer to the first issue, 
although some of its language was certainly consistent with understand-
ing freedom of expression to be a means for furthering individual self-
realization. Hence, it noted that freedom of expression is “the means by 
which the individual expresses his or her personal identity and sense of 
individuality”.24  
It was in the course of addressing the question of whether or not sec-
tion 2(b) protects commercial expression that the Court made specific 
reference to democratic self-government, the advancement of truth and 
knowledge and individual self-realization as the rationales for protecting 
freedom of expression. It did so in the following passage: 
Various attempts have been made to identify and formulate the values 
which justify the constitutional protection of freedom of expression. 
Probably the best known is that of Professor Thomas I. Emerson in his 
article, “Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment” (1963), 72 
Yale L.J. 877, where he sums up these values as follows at p. 878: 
   The values sought by society in protecting the right to 
freedom of expression may be grouped into four broad 
categories. Maintenance of a system of free expression is 
necessary (1) as assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a 
means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing 
participation by the members of the society in social, 
including political, decision-making, and (4) as maintaining 
the balance between stability and change in society. 
                                                                                                             
22 [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ford”]. 
23 R.S.Q. c. C-11, ss. 58 and 69. 
24 Supra, note 22, at 749. 
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The third and fourth of these values would appear to be closely related 
if not overlapping. Generally the values said to justify the constitutional 
protection of freedom of expression are stated as three-fold in nature, as 
appears from the article by Professor Sharpe referred to above on 
“Commercial Expression and the Charter”, where he speaks of the three 
“rationales” for such protection as follows at p. 232: 
   The first is that freedom of expression is essential to 
intelligent and democratic self-government.... The second 
theory is that freedom of expression protects an open 
exchange of views, thereby creating a competitive 
market-place of ideas which will enhance the search for the 
truth.... 
   The third theory values expression for its own sake. On this view, 
expression is seen as an aspect of individual autonomy. Expression is to 
be protected because it is essential to personal growth and 
self-realization …25 
At no point in its discussion in Ford of the rationales for protecting 
freedom of expression did the Court engage in the searching analysis of 
the many potential sources of guidance on that question that cases like 
Hunter v. Southam Inc. and Big M Drug Mart appeared to call for. None 
of the pre-Charter pronouncements by members of the Court on the 
benefits to society that flow from freedom of expression was mentioned. 
While most of those pronouncements had focused on the importance of 
freedom of expression to the effective functioning of a parliamentary 
system of government, and hence perhaps been seen to have been of 
limited value, one of them — an eloquent passage in the reasons for 
judgment of Justice Rand in R. v. Boucher26 — can be said to have 
invoked all three of the rationales identified in Ford, and therefore to 
have been particularly helpful to the Court’s cause. Nor did the Court 
acknowledge that those three rationales had all been subjected to careful 
scrutiny by American free speech scholars, or that there might be other 
rationales worth adding to the list.27 The Court appears simply to have 
                                                                                                             
25 Id., at 764-65. 
26 [1950] S.C.J. No. 41, [1951] S.C.R. 265, at 288 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Boucher”]. 
27 For a sampling of the body of literature that would have been available to the Court in 
1988, see, e.g., Robert Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems” (1971) 47 
Ind. L.J. 1; Thomas Scanlon, “A Theory of Freedom of Expression” (1972) 1 Phil. and Pub. Aff. 
204; C. Edwin Baker, “Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech” (1978) 25 U.C.L.A. L. 
Rev. 964; Harry Wellington, “On Freedom of Expression” (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 1105; Martin Redish, 
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accepted at face value the “generally” held view that these are the 
appropriate rationales to invoke. It is tempting to find fault with the 
Court for having taken this step without pausing to reflect on the wisdom 
of so doing, but given the novelty of the Charter and the paucity of useful 
Canadian sources at the time that Ford was decided, it is perhaps not too 
surprising that it did so.28 
However limited its discussion of the rationale issue in Ford may 
have been, the Court has been content to stay the course with democratic 
self-government, the advancement of truth and knowledge and individual 
self-realization as the philosophical underpinnings of section 2(b),29 
albeit with changes occasionally being made to the wording in which 
they are expressed. Their status as the accepted rationales was given 
strong affirmation in Irwin Toy,30 which followed closely in time on the 
heels of Ford and which also involved commercial expression. That case 
is probably best known for the special analytical framework that the 
Court created to resolve freedom of expression challenges, and it was in 
the course of developing that framework that the Court made reference to 
those values. Interestingly, and, it has to be said, surprisingly, the values 
were not invoked when the Court developed its understanding of the 
reach of freedom of expression, according to which section 2(b) protects 
all non-violent activities that constitute attempts to convey meaning. The 
Court’s justification for that very broad reach was articulated in terms of 
“ensur[ing] that everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, 
                                                                                                             
“The Value of Free Speech” (1982) 130 U. Penn. L. Rev. 591; and Stanley Ingber, “The Market-
place of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth” (1984) Duke L.J. 1. 
28 That is not to suggest that the Court was entirely bereft of potential sources of guidance 
on the matter (apart, of course, from the Sharpe article on which the Court relied in Ford, supra, note 
22). For examples of other scholarly treatments of the philosophical underpinnings of freedom of 
expression as a fundamental Canadian value that predated Ford, see Claire Beckton, “Freedom of 
Expression in Canada — How Free?” (1983) 13 Man. L.J. 583; Stefan Braun, “Freedom of 
Expression v. Obscenity Legislation: The Developing Canadian Jurisprudence” (1985-1986) 50 
Sask. L. Rev. 39; and Richard Moon, “The Scope of Freedom of Expression” (1985) 23 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 331. In spite of the fact that we now have a much larger body of scholarship on freedom of 
expression in Canada, in which the rationales are frequently mentioned and occasionally discussed, 
it remains the case that very little in the way of close and extended scrutiny has been given to them. 
For exceptions, see Richard Moon, “Drawing the Lines in a Culture of Prejudice: R. v. Keegstra and 
the Restriction of Hate Propaganda” (1992) 26 U.B.C. L. Rev. 99 (focusing on the self-realization 
rationale); Moon, “The Scope of Freedom of Expression”, supra, note 11 (focusing on the democrat-
ic self-government and self-realization rationales); Keith Dubick, “The Theoretical Foundation of 
Freedom of Expression” (2001-2002) 13 N.J.C.L. 1 (dealing with all three rationales); and Jacob 
Weinrib, “What is the Purpose of Freedom of Expression?” (2009) 67 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 165 (dealing 
with all three, but with a focus of self-realization). 
29 See, e.g., Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 
2, [2011] 1 S.C.R 19 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “C.B.C.”].  
30 Supra, note 7. 
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indeed all expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, dis-
tasteful or contrary to the mainstream”, and the importance those who 
live in “a free, pluralistic and democratic society” attach to “a diversity 
of ideas and opinions for their inherent value both to the community and 
to the individual”.31  
It was when the Court turned to the part of the framework dealing 
with the test for finding an infringement on freedom of expression that it 
invoked the three values. In keeping with its prior jurisprudence, the 
Court acknowledged that an infringement on section 2(b) could be found 
on either one of two different bases, the purpose of the impugned gov-
ernment action or its effect. It then went on to assert that if the govern-
ment in question could be shown by the challenger to have restricted a 
particular expressive activity because of a concern about the content of 
the message being communicated, the court should, on that basis alone, 
find the government guilty of a purpose-based infringement.32 However, 
the Court went on to hold, if the restriction could not be shown to have 
been based on such a concern, but had instead been based on a govern-
mental concern about the “physical consequences” of an expressive 
activity, then the challenger had the additional hurdle of having to show 
that that activity “promotes at least one of [the principles and values 
underlying the freedom]”.33 And those “principles and values”, the Court 
said, were the three that had been identified in Ford, now expressed in 
terms of  
(1) seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently good activity; (2) 
participation in social and political decision-making is to be fostered 
and encouraged; and (3) the diversity in forms of individual self-
fulfillment and human flourishing ought to be cultivated in an 
essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment not only for the 
sake of those who convey a meaning, but also for the sake of those to 
whom it is conveyed.34  
Having set out that part of the test, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he 
precise and complete articulation of what kinds of [expressive] activity 
promote these principles is, of course, a matter for judicial appreciation 
to be developed on a case-by-case basis”, but stipulated that “the 
[challenger] must at least identify the meaning being conveyed and 
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32 Id., at 974. 
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how it relates to the pursuit of truth, participation in the community, or 
individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing”.35 In the Court’s 
lexicon, this kind of infringement, if established, is called an effects-
based infringement. 
It is worth noting that, while the language used in Irwin Toy36 to de-
scribe the first two values tracks closely that used by Emerson and 
Sharpe in the relevant passages cited in Ford,37 the language used to 
describe the third is quite different. The passages in Ford refer simply to 
“individual self-fulfillment” (Emerson) and “individual autonomy” and 
“personal growth and self-realization” (Sharpe). The term “individual 
self-fulfillment” appears in the Irwin Toy formulation, of course, but that 
formulation refers to a good deal more as well. It makes very explicit 
what is at best left implicit in the Emerson and Sharpe passages, namely 
that this rationale engages the interests of both speakers and listeners. It 
also speaks to the critically important element of the larger social and 
political environment in which the process of individual self-fulfillment 
will take place. That environment, the Court in Irwin Toy says, should be 
“an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming [one]”.38 There is, in the 
incorporation of this additional element, not only an appreciation that 
environment can play a crucial role in the success or failure of individual 
projects of self-fulfillment, but also a sensitivity to the position of 
relative disadvantage in this regard suffered by members of groups that 
have experienced, or are experiencing, intolerance and prejudice. And, 
finally, there is the reference to the value of “diversity in forms of 
individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing”, suggesting that this 
third rationale serves larger societal as well as individual goals. The 
implication seems to be that it is not only individuals who profit from 
being allowed to realize their potential but, through the diversity of ways 
of living that emerges, the broader society as well. The precise nature of 
the benefit to society as a whole is, however, left unexplained. 
That the majority should have included the explicit reference to the in-
terests of both speakers and listeners in its formulation of the third ration-
ale is consistent with the Court’s handling of the narrow issue in Ford of 
whether section 2(b) protects commercial expression. It had already made 
it clear in that case that both sets of interests were engaged by this ration-
ale. But there had been nothing in any of its earlier section 2(b) decisions 
                                                                                                             
35 Id., at 977. 
36 Supra, note 7. 
37 See text accompanying note 25, supra. 
38 Supra, note 7, at 976. 
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to suggest that the Court’s conception of this rationale included the other 
elements added in Irwin Toy — the importance of environment and the 
benefits of diversity. One might therefore have expected some explanation 
for their inclusion. Regrettably, no explanation was provided. What the 
explanation might be, and what implications their inclusion might have  
for the resolution of section 2(b) cases, we are left to guess at. But their 
inclusion marks this formulation as different from most others, not only 
those of Emerson and Sharpe, but that of scholars such as Schauer  
as well.39 
It is a striking feature of the Court’s section 2(b) jurisprudence that 
only one of its members has ever seen fit to examine from a critical 
perspective the Court’s commitment to democratic self-government, the 
advancement of truth and knowledge and self-realization as providing 
the philosophical underpinning of freedom of expression. The author of 
that examination was McLachlin J. (as she then was), and the venue was 
her dissenting reasons for judgment in Keegstra.40 After noting that 
“[v]arious philosophical justifications exist for freedom of expression”, 
some of which “posit free expression as a means to other ends” while 
others “see freedom of expression as an end in itself”,41 she discussed 
what she called the “political process rationale”, which she placed in the 
instrumental category and which she noted was closely linked to the free 
speech tradition in the United States. In her view, while the validity of 
that rationale was “undeniable”, its reach was limited, because it only 
served to protect “expression relating to the political process”.42 And that 
reach, she said, was “much narrower than either the wording of the First 
Amendment or s. 2(b) of the Charter would suggest”.43 As for the ad-
vancement of truth and knowledge rationale, “also instrumental in 
outlook”, she accepted the critique that “freedom of expression provides 
no guarantee that the truth will always prevail”,44 and also acknowledged 
that, as a rationale, it too had limited reach, since “however important 
truth may be, certain opinions are incapable of being proven either true 
or false … [and] [m]any ideas and expressions which cannot be verified 
                                                                                                             
39 Supra, note 12, at 47-72. 
40 Supra, note 9. Justice McLachlin was joined in her dissent in Keegstra by La Forest and 
Sopinka JJ. We are therefore entitled to presume that the two of them agreed with her analysis of the 
three rationales. 
41 Id., at 802. 
42 Id. 
43 Id., at 803. 
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are valuable”.45 She nevertheless accepted that it is a valid rationale, 
noting that: 
One need only look to societies where freedom of expression has been 
curtailed to see the adverse effects both on truth and on human 
creativity. It is no coincidence that in societies where freedom of 
expression is severely restricted truth is often replaced by the coerced 
propagation of ideas that may have little relevance to the problems 
which the society actually faces. Nor is it a coincidence that industry, 
economic development and scientific and artistic creativity may 
stagnate in such societies.46 
Of the individual self-realization rationale, she said that it seeks to 
protect freedom of expression “for its own intrinsic value”, on the theory 
that, quoting Thomas Emerson, “expression is an integral part of the 
development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of 
self”.47 She made it clear that she understood this rationale to protect the 
self-realization interests of listeners as well as speakers, but was troubled 
by two aspects of it. She said that “[it] is arguably too broad and amor-
phous to found constitutional principle”,48 and that “it does not answer 
the question of why expression should be deserving of special constitu-
tional status, while other self-fulfilling activities are not”.49 Neither of 
these concerns is explored, however, in terms of either their origins or 
their implications; they are both simply stated. And in spite of them, she 
characterized individual self-realization as “a useful supplement to the 
more utilitarian rationales”.50 
Justice McLachlin then proceeded to invoke the observation of Freder-
ick Schauer that over the course of history governments have shown 
themselves to be especially untrustworthy and heavy-handed when regulat-
ing expressive activities.51 This tendency she attributed in part to the fact 
that “[governments] have an interest in stilling criticism of themselves, or 
even in enhancing their own popularity by silencing unpopular expres-
sion”.52 Whatever the reasons for it, this worrisome track record, she said, 
                                                                                                             
45 Id., at 804. 
46 Id., at 803-804. 
47 Id., at 804. 
48 Id., at 805. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Justice McLachlin cites Schauer’s book, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry, supra, 
note 12, in support of this assertion, but without any page reference. 
52 Keegstra, supra, note 9, at 805. 
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means that “government attempts to [curtail expression] must prima facie 
be viewed with suspicion”.53 
In the concluding paragraphs of her discussion of these rationales, 
McLachlin J. noted that “no one rationale provides the last word on 
freedom of expression”, and that, “[i]ndeed, it seems likely that theories 
about freedom of expression will continue to develop”.54 She observed 
that the broad wording of section 2(b) supports a broad and flexible 
approach to identifying the rationales underlying it, and that “[d]ifferent 
justifications … may assume varying degrees of importance in different 
fact situations”.55 She ended this part of her judgment with an affirmation 
of the legitimacy of all three of the rationales that the Court had attrib-
uted to freedom of expression in Ford and Irwin Toy, noting that “each of 
[them] is capable of providing guidance as to the scope and content of 
section 2(b)”.56 
Justice McLachlin’s exploration of the democratic self-government, 
advancement of truth and knowledge and individual self-realization 
rationales has not been the subject of comment in any of the Court’s 
subsequent section 2(b) cases. The Court appears to have proceeded on 
the assumption that, however vulnerable to criticism the values may be in 
the view of some of its members, they are the accepted rationales, and, as 
a result, they have continued to serve as the measuring sticks against 
which expressive activities have been evaluated when section 2(b) has 
been invoked.  
III. THE DOCTRINAL ROLES ASSIGNED TO  
THE THREE VALUES 
Democratic self-government, the advancement of truth and knowl-
edge and individual self-realization do more than provide the philosophi-
cal underpinning of freedom of expression as a constitutional right. They 
have also been assigned a range of doctrinal roles by the Court, within 
which they assist in the resolution of both challenges to governmental 
action based on section 2(b) and a narrow range of common law and 
statute-based cases in which section 2(b) is invoked. In each of these 
roles, courts are required to engage with the values in the context of the 
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particular challenge before them as part of its analysis of the merits of 
the claim being made. The purpose of this part of the paper is to provide 
a description of the origins and precise nature of each of these roles.  
Before turning to the first of them, however, it is important to make 
explicit a significant — and in my view, unfortunate57 — feature of the 
Court’s use of the values underlying section 2(b) that would otherwise be 
left implicit. That is the fact that the Court in Irwin Toy held that section 
2(b) protects any and all non-violent attempts to convey meaning, 
regardless of the content of the meaning being conveyed, and in particu-
lar, regardless of whether or not that content furthers any of the rationales 
the Court has ascribed to section 2(b). Freedom of expression is therefore 
a Charter right to which the purposive approach has not been applied, at 
least when the Court defined its reach in relation to expressive content. 
There have been a couple of instances — one of which predated Irwin 
Toy — in which members of the Court have used those rationales in 
support of granting protection to particular expressive content, but those 
cases are very much the exception to the rule.58 The rule is that the 
rationales underlying section 2(b) do not have a role to play in determin-
ing the scope and meaning of freedom of expression insofar as expres-
sive content is concerned.  
As we are about to see, however, the rationales have come to play a 
role in defining the reach of section 2(b) in relation to access to both 
public property and government-held documents for expressive purposes. 
1.  Access to Public Property for Expressive Purposes 
The Court’s approach to the first claim to come before it that section 
2(b) guarantees access to public property for the purpose of engaging in 
expressive activity was a deeply fractured one. The context out of which 
that claim emerged involved a rule prohibiting the holding up of placards 
and distribution of pamphlets at Dorval Airport outside Montreal. In the 
result, all seven members of the Court who sat on the case agreed that the 
claim should succeed, and the rule was struck down. However, that 
shared conclusion was arrived at using three very different analytical 
approaches. One member of the Court in that case, Committee for the 
                                                                                                             
57 I have criticized this feature of the Court’s approach to s. 2(b) elsewhere: see R. Elliot, 
“Back to Basics: A Critical Look at the Irwin Toy Framework for Freedom of Expression” (2011) 15 
Rev. Const. Stud. 205. 
58 The cases are Ford, supra, note 22 (commercial expression ) and R. v. Zundel, [1992] 
S.C.J. No. 70, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Zundel”] (deliberate falsehoods). 
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Commonwealth of Canada v. Canada,59 L’Heureux-Dubé J., was of the 
view that section 2(b) guarantees access to public property for expressive 
purposes in any and all circumstances. Three members of the Court, led 
by Lamer C.J.C., were of the view that section 2(b) only guarantees such 
access when the expressive activity in question can be said to be consis-
tent with the primary function of the property to which access is being 
sought. Three other members of the Court, led by McLachlin J. (again, as 
she then was), were of the view that, unless it could be shown that access 
was being denied because of a concern about the content of the message 
to be conveyed, section 2(b) only guaranteed such access if engaging in 
expressive activity on the public property in question furthered at least 
one of democratic self-government, the advancement of truth and knowl-
edge or individual self-realization.60 (It should be noted that whatever 
access ended up being guaranteed under these different approaches to the 
reach of section 2(b) was subject to being overridden by a section 1 
justification.)  
That difference of opinion about the correct approach to take to such 
claims remained intact61 until 2005 when the Court decided the case of 
Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366 Quebec Inc.62 The claim in that case 
resulted from an attempt by the City of Montreal to enforce its anti-noise 
by-law against a strip club that was using a loudspeaker to amplify the 
music and commentary accompanying the show inside so that passers-by 
could hear them. In their joint reasons for judgment in that case, speaking 
for a majority of six (of seven), McLachlin C.J.C. (the only member of 
the Court left of those who participated in Committee for the Common-
wealth) and Deschamps J. prescribed a new test that borrowed signifi-
cantly from the approaches taken by Lamer C.J.C. and McLachlin J. in 
the earlier case. That new test entailed asking “whether the [public 
property] is a public place where one would expect constitutional protec-
tion for free expression on the basis that expression in that place does not 
conflict with the purposes which s. 2(b) is intended to serve, namely (1) 
democratic discourse, (2) truth finding and (3) self-fulfillment”.63 In 
applying this test, they said that courts should consider both “the histori-
                                                                                                             
59 [1991] S.C.J. No. 3, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Committee for the Com-
monwealth”]. 
60 Justice McLachlin invoked the infringement part of Irwin Toy framework (see text ac-
companying notes 30-32, supra) in support of this approach. 
61 See Ramsden v. Peterborough (City), [1993] S.C.J. No. 87, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ramsden”]. 
62 [2005] S.C.J. No. 63, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “City of Montreal”]. 
63 Id., at para. 73. 
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cal or actual function of the place” and “whether other aspects of the 
place suggest that expression within it would undermine the values 
underlying free expression”.64 Here again, therefore, the connection, or 
lack thereof, between expressive activity and the values said to underlie 
section 2(b) becomes critical to the outcome of the freedom of expres-
sion claim. And with that test now having established itself as the gov-
erning test, the role assigned to the values within it has become an 
important feature of the Court’s approach in this particular area of the 
law relating to section 2(b). 
It should be noted that to this point, the Court has decided only five 
cases involving claims of access to public property for expressive pur-
poses.65 At least one member of the Court has considered the reach of the 
three values in all of them. In none of the cases, however, has any 
member of the Court engaged in any real analysis of the meaning or 
scope of any of the values; in all of them, the reasoning was brief and 
highly conclusory in nature. The light shed by these cases on the Court’s 
understanding of the values must therefore be said to be modest. 
2.  Access to Government Documents for Expressive Purposes 
In Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn.,66 
decided in 2010, the Court confronted for the first time a claim that 
access by a member of the public to government-held documents was 
guaranteed by section 2(b). The documents in question related to an 
investigation into alleged misconduct on the part of the police in Ontario, 
and the claim — which was ultimately unsuccessful — was made 
pursuant to that province’s access to information legislation. The ap-
proach the Court adopted to the claim gave the values underlying section 
2(b) an important doctrinal role, although the precise nature of that role 
remains somewhat unclear. Drawing on both Irwin Toy and City of 
Montreal, McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J., speaking for the Court, held 
that, when such claims are made, the first step in the inquiry “asks 
whether the demand for access to information furthers the purposes of 
                                                                                                             
64 Id., at para. 74. 
65 In addition to Committee for the Commonwealth, Ramsden and City of Montreal, see 
Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students — British 
Columbia Component, [2009] S.C.J. No. 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Greater 
Vancouver Transportation Authority”], and C.B.C., supra, note 29. 
66 [2010] S.C.J. No. 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Criminal Lawyers’ 
Assn.”]. 
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s. 2(b)”.67 If that question is answered in the affirmative, section 2(b) will 
be engaged, but, they said, only in a prima facie sense, because the 
protection afforded by section 2(b) will be lost “if the documents sought 
are protected by privilege or if production of the documents would 
interfere with the proper functioning of the governmental institution in 
question”.68  
It is within the first step that the values play their doctrinal role, and 
that role again requires consideration of the relationship between the 
expressive activity in question — in this context, a claim of access to 
documents — and those values. The lack of clarity in relation to that role 
concerns the range of values to be taken into account. The fact that, in 
formulating that step, the Chief Justice and Abella J. referred generally to 
“the purposes of s. 2(b)” suggests that it is open to a claimant to try to 
link the expressive activity in which the documents in question would be 
used to any one of the three values. However, in the very next sentence, 
the Chief Justice and Abella J. went on to say that, “In the case of de-
mands for government documents, the relevant s. 2(b) purpose is usually 
the furtherance of discussion on matters of public importance,”69 which 
suggests that the Court had in mind only the democratic self-government 
and (perhaps) the advancement of truth and knowledge rationales as the 
relevant measuring sticks in this context; the individual self-realization 
rationale appears to have no role to play. That inference is supported by 
the fact that the analysis of the merits of the particular claim made in that 
case was limited to the question of whether or not access to the docu-
ments sought was “necessary for the meaningful exercise of free expres-
sion on matters of public or political interest”,70 as well as by their initial 
articulation of the reach of section 2(b) in such circumstances, which was 
to the effect that “[a]ccess is a derivative right which may arise where it 
is a necessary precondition of meaningful expression on the functioning 
of government”.71 
However, there are reasons to doubt that the Chief Justice and Justice 
Abella intended their judgment in that case to be read in that restrictive 
                                                                                                             
67 Id., at para. 34. That the Court should have invoked City of Montreal in support of its 
approach is hardly surprising, given the close resemblance between a claim for access to a publicly 
held document and a claim for access to publicly owned property.  
68 Id., at para. 33. The concern about “the proper functioning of the governmental institution 
in question” clearly reflects the Court’s new approach in City of Montreal to claims for access to 
publicly owned property. 
69 Id., at para. 34. 
70 Id., at para. 36. 
71 Id., at para. 30. 
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way. There is nothing to suggest that, when they spoke of “the purposes 
of s. 2(b)” in articulating the first analytical step, individual self-
realization was not to count. And it will have been noted that their later 
formulation of that same step contains the word “usually”, implying that 
in some cases the purpose for which government-held documents are 
sought might engage a purpose other than “the furtherance of discussion 
on matters of public importance”. Moreover, it was clear that the reason 
that the claimants wanted access to the documents in that particular case 
was to expose to public scrutiny the details of alleged wrongdoing on the 
part of police officers and Crown prosecutors in a particular criminal 
prosecution — matters that would clearly fit the description of “matters 
of public or political interest” and “the functioning of government”. 
Their choice of those words may therefore have been a function of the 
particular facts with which they had to deal.  
Even if the Court remains open to considering the individual self-
realization rationale as one of the “purposes” in the context of such 
claims, it is clear that the use to which the three values are put here is 
different from the use to which they are put in the context of access to 
public property examined above. In that context, as we saw, the burden 
on the challenger is simply to show that expressive activity in a particu-
lar place is not inconsistent with the values. Here, while the initial 
formulation of the first step speaks simply of the demand for access 
having to further the purposes of section 2(b), the test actually applied 
requires the challenger to show that access to the documents in question 
is “necessary for the meaningful exercise of free expression”. That 
would appear to be a much more onerous standard. The implication of 
that language seems clearly to be that, unless the claimant can show 
that his or her ability to engage “meaningfully” in the expressive 
activity in question depends on having access to the desired documents, 
section 2(b) will not be engaged.72  
                                                                                                             
72 Why the Court saw fit to impose this higher standard is not explained, but it is not unrea-
sonable to think that it reflects the fact that a claim of access to government-held documents is much 
more in the nature of a positive rights claim than a claim of access to publicly held property, and the 
courts have shown themselves to be wary of granting positive rights claims under the fundamental 
freedoms category. See, in this regard, Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 
(S.C.C.). I am grateful to my colleague Margot Young for this insight. 
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3. Effects-based Infringements 
The doctrinal role played by the values in this context has already been 
introduced above, in the discussion of Irwin Toy.73 If a restriction of 
expressive activity cannot be said to have been prompted by a governmen-
tal concern about the content of the message being communicated, but was 
prompted instead by a concern about what the Court termed the “physical 
consequences” of that activity, the restriction will only be held to constitute 
an infringement on freedom of expression if the challenger can show that 
the expressive activity in question furthers in some fashion democratic 
self-government, the advancement of truth and knowledge or individual 
self-realization. The “or” at the end of that sentence is important. In order 
to meet this requirement, the challenger does not have to show that the 
expressive activity furthers all three of those values; one will do. But the 
challenger must show that it furthers at least one. Failure to satisfy that 
requirement will bring the challenge to an unsuccessful end.  
What kinds of restrictions qualify under this rubric, which the Court 
refers to as “effects-based infringements”? The Court addressed that 
question in Irwin Toy, but, at least from my standpoint, its answer left a 
good deal to be desired. It said that a rule against handing out pamphlets 
would not qualify, because it was “tied to content”. And that was so, the 
Court said, even if the rule was designed to keep litter off public thor-
oughfares, because “[t]he rule aims to control access by others to a 
meaning being conveyed as well as to control the ability of the pamphle-
teer to convey a meaning. To restrict this form of expression, handing out 
pamphlets, entails restricting its content”.74 On the other hand, the Court 
said, a rule against littering would qualify. Such a rule, in the Court’s 
view, would not be “a restriction ‘tied to content’, …[because] it aims to 
control the physical consequences of certain conduct regardless of 
whether that conduct attempts to convey meaning”.75 It is difficult to 
quibble with the Court’s characterization of the latter rule (unless, of 
course, there is evidence that the rule masked a desire to get rid of certain 
messages to which the government objected). However, there is reason to 
question the characterization of the former rule. Unless it could be shown 
that a rule against handing out pamphlets was prompted by a concern 
about the messages being conveyed by particular pamphleteers, it is 
difficult to understand why such a rule should be characterized as “tied to 
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content”; it would seem, like the rule against littering, to be agnostic as 
to content and hence to constitute an effects-based infringement.76 
Whatever one thinks of the examples the Court gives to explain the 
difference between purpose-based and effects-based infringements on 
freedom of expression, the doctrinal role played by the three values in 
relation to the latter remains intact: if the test of a purpose-based in-
fringement cannot be satisfied, the challenger will have to show that the 
expressive activity in question furthers in some way at least one of 
democratic self-government, the advancement of truth and knowledge 
and individual self-realization.  
Note, however, that the role of the values in this context is different 
from their role in the context of access to public property, and in two 
respects. The first, and more important, is that the focus of the inquiry 
here is on the relationship between the particular expressive activity in 
question and the three values, rather than on the relationship between any 
expressive activity on the public property in question and those values; it 
is the particular expressive activity and not the place in which it would, 
or did, take place that is the focus of the analysis. The second and more 
subtle difference is that, instead of requiring the challenger to show that 
the particular expressive activity in question does not conflict with or 
undermine any of those values, here the challenger is required to show 
that the expressive activity in question furthers at least one of those 
values. Why the Court has chosen to use different language in these two 
contexts is unclear. So, too, at least to this point, is the practical signifi-
cance, if any, of the difference. 
The role of the values in this context is also different from their role 
in the context of access to government-held documents. There, as we 
saw, the claimant bears the onerous burden of showing that such access 
is necessary to the meaningful exercise of free expression. Here, the 
claimant need only show that the expressive activity in question furthers 
at least one of the values, a much less onerous burden.  
In spite of the lengths to which the Court went in Irwin Toy to distin-
guish between, and explain its understandings of, purpose-based and 
                                                                                                             
76 My colleague Bill Black has suggested that there may well be something qualitatively 
different about pamphlets and ordinary litter, in that all pamphlets — but not all litter — will contain 
attempts to convey meaning of one sort or another. Even if that is true, however, it is still difficult to 
see how that difference should lead to the conclusion that a rule against handing out pamphlets is 
“tied to content” given the broad range of different messages that pamphlets can contain. At best, 
that difference could be said to argue for special vigilance on the part of the courts when they are 
asked to review such a rule to ensure that it does not mask an attempt to control a particular message.  
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effects-based infringements of freedom of expression, we have only three 
cases to this point in which members of the Court have applied its 
understanding of the latter.77 All three of these cases involved claims of 
access to public property for expressive purposes in which the members 
of the Court in question, using what they considered to be the relevant 
test, had found that section 2(b) did protect the claimant’s interest in 
obtaining access. The next question they had to resolve was whether or 
not the impugned governmental action infringed on that protected 
interest. And because in each of these cases (but not in the other two 
cases involving claims of access to public property that got to this 
stage)78 the members of the Court were satisfied that access to the 
property in question for expressive purposes had been denied for reasons 
unrelated to the content of the message that the claimants wished to 
convey, that question fell to be determined on the basis of the require-
ments prescribed in Irwin Toy for an effects-based infringement. And that 
in turn meant that the claimant had to show that the expressive activity in 
question furthered at least one of the three values underlying section 
2(b). In all three of these cases, that showing was held to have been 
made, and with very little discussion. 
4. Section 1  
The last of the doctrinal roles played by the three values in the reso-
lution of section 2(b) challenges to government action arises at the 
section 1 stage, at which point the issue for the court is whether the 
government in question can justify the infringement on freedom of 
expression that the court has held (or, as sometimes occurs, the govern-
ment has conceded) to have taken place. The application of section 1 
pursuant to the Oakes framework79 and the refinements made to it in 
subsequent cases entails both an ends and a means inquiry. The ends 
inquiry requires the government whose conduct has been held to infringe 
on a Charter right or freedom to establish that it had a valid and “suffi-
ciently important” purpose for engaging in that conduct, while the means 
inquiry requires that government to establish that that conduct is ration-
                                                                                                             
77 The cases are Committee for the Commonwealth, supra, note 59 (per McLachlin J., for 
three members of a seven-member panel), Ramsden, supra, note 61 (per Iacobucci J. for the Court) 
and City of Montreal, supra, note 62 (per McLachlin C.J.C. and Deschamps J. for six members of a 
seven-member panel).  
78 Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority and C.B.C., both supra, note 65. 
79 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
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ally connected to that purpose, that it minimally impairs the right or 
freedom, and that the benefits to society that flow from that conduct 
outweigh the costs. When the right at stake is freedom of expression, the 
extent to which the expressive activity in question can be said to further 
democratic self-government, the advancement of truth and knowledge 
and individual self-realization can, and often does, play a significant role 
in determining the outcome of those inquiries, particularly the latter two 
components of the means inquiry.  
The origins of this role can be found in two cases decided in 1989 
and 1990 respectively. In the first, Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attor-
ney General),80 the Court was confronted with a challenge to provincial 
legislation restricting the ability of the media to publish information 
revealed in court proceedings in matrimonial disputes. In separate 
reasons for judgment concurring with the majority that the legislation 
should be struck down, Wilson J. laid the foundation for what she 
termed, and has come to be known as, the “contextual approach” to the 
application of section 1. According to that approach, the interests to be 
balanced at that stage of the analysis of a Charter case should be defined, 
not in the abstract, but in terms of the specific legislative and factual 
context out of which the particular case has arisen. Hence, rather than 
balance the right to privacy writ large against freedom of expression writ 
large, she argued that the relevant competing interests were the interest in 
not having the details of matrimonial disputes made public (an aspect of 
the right to privacy) and the interest in having the media cover the 
resolution of such disputes by the courts (an aspect of freedom of expres-
sion). She justified that approach on the following basis: 
One virtue of the contextual approach … is that it recognizes that a 
particular right or freedom may have a different value depending on the 
context. It may be, for example, that freedom of expression has greater 
value in a political context than it does in the context of disclosure of 
details of a matrimonial dispute. The contextual approach attempts to 
bring into sharp relief the aspect of the right or freedom which is truly 
at stake in the case as well as the relevant aspects of any values in 
competition with it. It seems to be more sensitive to the reality of the 
dilemma posed by the particular facts and therefore more conducive to 
finding a fair and just compromise between the two competing values 
under section 1 …81 
                                                                                                             
80 [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edmonton Journal”]. 
81 Id., at 1355-56. 
460 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 59 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
The second case is Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of 
Ontario,82 in which the issue was the validity of a legislative regime 
restricting the ability of dentists in Ontario to advertise. Having held that 
that regime infringed on section 2(b), McLachlin J., speaking for the 
Court, turned her attention to the question of justification under section 
1. Early in her analysis she noted that “not all expression is equally 
worthy of protection”83 and then proceeded to assess the value of the 
particular form of expression at issue in that case, using as a measure the 
three Ford rationales for protecting freedom of expression. Pointing out 
that the motive behind dentists’ advertising “is, in most cases, merely 
economic”, she reasoned that the loss that they suffered if they were 
prevented from advertising “is merely loss of profit, and not loss of 
opportunity to participate in the political process or the ‘marketplace of 
ideas’, or to realize one’s spiritual or artistic self-fulfillment”.84 However, 
she said, this kind of speech “does serve an important public interest by 
enhancing the ability of patients to make informed choices”, and more-
over, “the choice of a dentist must be counted as a relatively important 
consumer decision”.85 In this latter regard, she contrasted Rocket with 
Irwin Toy, where, she said, “the majority did not emphasize the consumer 
choice aspect, because the expression in question was advertising aimed 
at children, and the majority clearly felt that protection of consumer 
choice in children was much less important than it would be in adults”.86 
In the result, she concluded that the freedom of expression interest in 
Rocket was, while not at the highest importance end of the spectrum, not 
at the lowest importance end either. And, at least in part on the basis of 
that conclusion, she held that the infringement on section 2(b) embodied 
in the impugned legislation could not be justified. 
What is significant for our purposes about this analysis is that the 
valuation of the freedom of expression interest in that case was very 
explicitly based on the extent to which the particular kind of expression 
in question could be said to further the three rationales for freedom of 
expression articulated in Ford. The implication of that analysis was that, 
the more of those rationales that can be shown to be furthered, and the 
greater the extent to which each of them can be shown to be furthered, 
the greater will be the weight to be given to the freedom of expression 
                                                                                                             
82 [1999] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rocket”]. 
83 Id., at 247. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id., at 247-48. 
(2012), 59 S.C.L.R. (2d) PROTECTING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 461 
interest in the balancing called for by section 1, and the greater the 
likelihood that the challenger will be successful. Here again, then, we see 
these three values playing an important role in the resolution of section 
2(b) cases. 
It remains to be noted that in some of its section 2(b) decisions, the 
Court has used the terms “core” and “periphery” to refer to expression 
interests that, using this evaluative methodology, are determined to be of 
particularly high or low value. For example, in Butler, Sopinka J., 
speaking for seven members of the Court, said of the freedom of expres-
sion interest implicated in the publication and distribution of obscene 
material that it “does not stand on an equal footing with other kinds of 
expression which directly engage the ‘core’ of the freedom of expression 
values”,87 and in RJR, La Forest J. in his dissent concluded that tobacco 
advertising lay “as far from the ‘core’ of freedom of expression as 
prostitution, hate mongering or pornography, and [is] thus [entitled] to a 
very low degree of protection under s. 1”.88 It might be tempting to some 
to treat the Court’s use of these metaphors as an indication that the Court 
is of the view that all expressive activities can be slotted into one of two 
categories, high value (core) and low value (periphery). In my view, that 
temptation should be resisted. Not only has the Court never adopted that 
interpretation of its use of the metaphors, but such an interpretation is 
inconsistent with the willingness that the Court has evidenced in some 
cases to draw subtle distinctions between expressive activities that on the 
face of it appear to be very similar. That willingness was certainly 
evident in Rocket, in which, as we saw above, McLachlin J. expended 
considerable effort in distinguishing between commercial advertising to 
children and commercial advertising to adults, and attaching greater 
weight to the latter than to the former. 
5.  Changing the Common Law 
Not all of the contexts in which the rationales underlying freedom of 
expression have come to play a doctrinal role are the product of chal-
lenges in which section 2(b) is invoked against legislation or other 
governmental action. Those rationales have also come to play a role in 
the resolution of cases in which freedom of expression is invoked in 
support of an attempt to persuade the Court that a particular area of the 
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88 Supra, note 7, at para. 75. 
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common law is in need of revision. Such cases, it should be noted, are 
few and far between; this category is therefore a very small one. 
The category is exemplified by the two cases in which the Court has 
been asked to revise the common law of defamation to better protect 
freedom of expression. In the first of these, Hill v. Church of Scientology 
of Toronto,89 the Court was asked — but declined — to extend the reach 
of the existing defence of qualified privilege; in the second, Grant v. 
Torstar Corp.,90 it was asked — and agreed — to create a new defence of 
responsible communication on matters of public interest. In both cases, 
the Court framed the issue before it in terms of whether or not the 
common law of defamation as it stood prior to the case in question 
having arisen struck an appropriate balance between freedom of expres-
sion (as a constitutional “value” rather than as a constitutional “right”) 
and the right that every person has not to have his or her reputation 
unfairly sullied. If the Court concluded that the common law did strike 
an appropriate balance, as occurred in Hill, there would be no reason to 
make the requested change; if the Court concluded that it did not, and 
reached that conclusion on the basis that insufficient weight was being 
given to the freedom of expression interest, as occurred in Grant v. 
Torstar, the requested change could be made.91 In both cases, the Court 
factored into its analysis an assessment of the extent to which the kind of 
defamatory speech in question could be said to further the rationales for 
protecting freedom of expression. As in the context of a section 1 analy-
sis, that assessment helped to determine the weight to be given to the 
freedom of expression interest in the balancing process. The other 
example we have of this use being made of the values underlying section 
2(b) is Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 558 v. 
Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd.,92 in which the Court was 
asked — and agreed — to change the common law governing secondary 
picketing. Again, the Court measured the expressive activity at issue 
                                                                                                             
89 [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hill”]. 
90 [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant v. Torstar”]. The 
Court decided another defamation case at the same time, Quan v. Cusson, [2009] S.C.J. No. 62, 
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.), in which it also recognized and applied the new defence of responsible 
communication on matters of public interest. 
91 I say “could be made” because the Court might conclude that the change being requested 
was of such a far-reaching nature as to call for legislative rather than judicial action, and refuse to 
make it on that basis even though it was satisfied of the need for change. See, in this regard, R. v. 
Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654 (S.C.C.). 
92 [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156 (S.C.C.). 
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against the values to help it determine the weight to be given to the 
freedom of expression interest in the balancing process. 
6.  Application of Legislation 
I have only been able to find one case in which the Court has made 
use of the values underlying freedom of expression in the context of 
interpreting and applying the provision of a legislative enactment that 
poses a threat to the freedom. The case is Sierra Club of Canada v. 
Canada (Minister of Finance),93 and the legislative enactment implicated 
in that case was Rule 151 of the Federal Court Rules,94 which reads as 
follows:  
 151(1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed 
shall be treated as confidential. 
 (2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be 
satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, 
notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court 
proceedings. 
The Court had been asked in that case to issue a confidentiality order in 
respect of certain documentary evidence in a judicial review application, 
the effect of which would be to deny access to it to members of the 
public. The decision under challenge in that application was an agree-
ment by the federal government to provide funding assistance to Atomic 
Energy of Canada Limited in respect of the construction and sale to China 
of two nuclear reactors, and the claim by the party making that challenge 
was that that decision triggered the need for an environmental assessment 
under section 5(1)(b) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act.95 The 
request for the confidentiality order came from the company. In deciding 
whether or not to grant that order, Iacobucci J., speaking for the Court, 
measured “the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings” in 
the context of that particular case against each of democratic self-
government, the advancement of truth and knowledge and individual self-
realization; that measuring process was the basis upon which he assessed 
the strength of that “public interest”. In the result, he issued the order. 
                                                                                                             
93 [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sierra Club”]. 
94 SOR/98-106. 
95 S.C. 1992, c. 37. 
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Sierra Club is, of course, an unusual case. It may even be unique. 
Not every legislative enactment that poses a threat to freedom of expres-
sion will, like section 151, effectively require the courts to take the 
freedom of expression interest into account when they are called upon to 
apply it. However, there was nothing in section 151 that required the 
Court to take that interest into account in precisely the way in which 
Iacobucci J. did. The fact that he chose to do it by making explicit use of 
all three of the values underlying section 2(b) suggests that the case may 
have a broader precedential effect than might initially be thought. Only 
time will tell. 
IV. THE COURT’S UNDERSTANDING OF THE REACH OF THE THREE 
VALUES 
Having outlined the process by which the Court came to adopt de-
mocratic self-government, the advancement of truth and knowledge and 
individual self-realization as the philosophical underpinnings to section 
2(b), and explained the different doctrinal roles that these values have 
been assigned by the Court, it is time now to explore the meanings that 
the Court has given to each of them.  
Such an exploration could be structured in a variety of different ways 
— on a case by case basis, beginning with Ford and ending with the 
Court’s most recent section 2(b) decision in which the values have been 
considered; on the basis of the different doctrinal roles; on the basis of 
the major categories of expressive content that the Court has been called 
upon to consider in relation to the values (commercial expression, 
obscenity, hate speech, etc.); on the basis of issues that have shown 
themselves to be common to the Court’s consideration of the values 
(such as whether and, if so, to what extent the connection between a 
particular expressive activity and the values is adversely affected by a 
finding that responses to that activity are unlikely to be rational); or on 
the basis of the values themselves. I decided to use the values themselves 
as the primary organizing principle. That choice was based on a number 
of considerations, the most important of which is its consistency with the 
purpose of this part of the paper, which is to take stock of the Court’s 
understanding of each of the values. It has to be acknowledged, however, 
that this approach is not without its problems. If one believes, as I do, 
that what the Court has said about the reach of these values in a given 
case has frequently, if not always, been a product of the particular free 
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speech issue with which the Court was dealing in that case, a full under-
standing of what the Court has to say about the reach of a particular 
value in a given case can only be achieved if attention is paid to the 
jurisprudential context out of which what was said emerged. Using the 
values as the organizing principle also poses a challenge when, as is 
often the case, the Court treats them as a group rather than as distinct 
components of the analysis. Not only is it often difficult to disaggregate 
what the Court has to say about each of them in such circumstances, but 
one runs the risk of leaving out important aspects of the Court’s thinking 
about them. Finally, I should note that, while the values themselves serve 
as the primary organizing principle, the discussion of each value has 
been broken down into a number of component parts, with subheadings 
for each, and with those subheadings often reflecting the major catego-
ries of expressive content, as well as taking account of common issues 
such as the significance of irrationality on the part of listeners.  
The understanding that the Court has developed of each of the three 
values could, at least in theory, be revealed in at least two different ways. 
One is through the provision by the Court of general descriptions of 
those understandings. The Court might, for example, have chosen to 
articulate a particular conception of what it believes democratic self-
government to entail in a case in which that value was thought to play a 
particularly important role. The other is through the discrete holdings that 
the Court has made in a series of individual cases in which, in accor-
dance with the different doctrinal roles the Court has assigned to the 
values, it is called upon to measure particular expressive activities 
against them. When, for example, the Court holds that a particular 
expressive activity furthers democratic self-government, it is telling us 
that its conception of that value is one that includes — or at least entails 
the protection of — that interest. By the same token, when the Court 
holds that a particular activity does not further that value, it is telling us 
that its conception of the value is one that does not require or entail the 
protection of that activity. From the standpoint of the person conducting 
the search, the task is made much easier if the Court adopts the former 
approach; one simply has to find the descriptions and set them out. 
Regrettably, the Court has not yet adopted that approach in relation to 
any of the three values. It has instead heeded the advice given early on 
by McLachlin J. in Committee for the Commonwealth, where she said: 
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Questions will doubtless arise as to the exact ambit of the pursuit of 
truth, participation in the community and the conditions necessary for 
individual fulfillment and human flourishing. It would be wrong to 
attempt to comprehensively define these values at the outset. Apart 
from the difficulties of such a venture, there would be a risk of 
foreclosing constitutional protection for expression which should be 
protected.96 
Hence, the search that I have conducted has, of necessity, been a 
more challenging one than it might have been. It has entailed reviewing 
all of the Court’s section 2(b) jurisprudence with an eye to finding 
references to the values in the context of discussions about the connec-
tion, or lack thereof, between them and the particular kinds of expressive 
activities at issue in each case. Every effort has been made to be both 
thorough and accurate in the conduct of that review; it is certainly 
possible, however, that relevant references have been missed.  
In conducting this search, I have been sensitive not only to the 
Court’s position on the question of whether or not particular kinds of 
expression further one or more of the values, but also to its position on 
the question of the extent to which those that do can be said to further 
them. As we will see, the Court has made it clear that, in its view, differ-
ent expressive activities further particular values to varying degrees. 
Hence, while the Court has held that all commercial expression furthers 
the individual self-realization of potential consumers, it has also held that 
some commercial expression — advertising by dentists, for example — 
furthers that value to a greater degree than others — for example, adver-
tising of toys to children. A complete picture of the Court’s understand-
ing of the values requires that these kinds of distinction be included. 
It is important to emphasize again that the primary objective of this 
part of the paper is to extract from the Court’s section 2(b) jurisprudence 
the understanding that the Court has articulated of each of the three 
values. While I do make a number of observations about those under-
standings, these observations are of very limited scope and are intended 
to clarify the Court’s position, not to critique it. That critique will be 
made in a separate paper.  
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1.  Democratic Self-Government 
In Keegstra, Dickson C.J.C. characterized “the connection between 
freedom of expression and the political process” as “perhaps the linchpin 
of the s. 2(b) guarantee”.97 What the Court often refers to as “political 
expression” — a shorthand way of capturing the many different expres-
sive activities that are understood by it to further democratic self-
government — has been said to lie at the “core” of freedom of expres-
sion, and hence to be of the greatest value. Infringements of “political 
expression” are therefore viewed by the Court as the most difficult for 
governments to justify under section 1. 
The importance of the connection between freedom of expression 
and democratic self-government has long been recognized in Canadian 
law, and one can find numerous passages in judgments from both the 
pre- and post-Charter eras attesting to it. One of its earliest and most 
eloquent expositions came in Cannon J.’s oft-quoted passage from his 
judgment in Reference re Alberta Legislation98 from the 1930s: 
Freedom of discussion is essential to enlighten public opinion in a 
democratic State; it cannot be curtailed without affecting the right of 
the people to be informed through sources independent of government 
concerning matters of public interest. There must be untrammelled 
publication of the news and political opinion of the political parties 
contending for ascendency. … Democracy cannot be maintained 
without its foundation: free public opinion and free discussion 
throughout the nation of all matters affecting the State within the limits 
set by the criminal code and the common law. …99 
To similar effect is a frequently cited passage from Justice Cory’s much 
more recent reasons for judgment in Edmonton Journal: 
It is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more important to a 
democratic society than freedom of expression. Indeed a democracy 
cannot exist without that freedom to express new ideas and to put 
forward opinions about the functioning of public institutions. The 
concept of free and uninhibited speech permeates all truly democratic 
                                                                                                             
97 Supra, note 9, at 763. 
98 [1938] S.C.J. No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.). 
99 Id., at 145-46. For another early judicial exposition of the importance of freedom of ex-
pression to our system of government, see Rand J.’s reasons for judgment in Boucher, supra, note 
26, at 288. 
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societies and institutions. The vital importance of the concept cannot be 
over-emphasized.100  
Our interest here is less in the importance of freedom of expression 
to self-government than it is in the precise character or nature of the 
connection between the two. However, the fact that expressive activities 
that are seen to further the goal of democratic self-government are 
viewed by the Court as lying at the “core” of freedom of expression, and 
hence to warrant special protection, means that the definition given to 
democratic self-government for this purpose takes on added importance. 
In effect, that definition helps to determine the extent of the “core” of 
freedom of expression; the broader the definition is, the larger that “core” 
becomes. 
The questions of interest to us now are: How is it that the Court sees 
freedom of expression as protecting and facilitating democratic decision-
making? Or, more precisely, what kinds of expressive activities does the 
Court see as performing that function? Does the Court believe it is 
possible to draw meaningful distinctions between activities that do 
perform that function in terms of the extent to which they do so, and on 
that basis accord greater (or lesser) weight within the “core” to some than 
to others? Does the Court think it is possible, for example, to characterize 
some expressive activities as being truly integral to the proper function-
ing of a healthy democracy while characterizing others as being only 
loosely connected to that end?  
As noted in the introductory section of this paper, the Court has 
made no attempt to define in anything approaching comprehensive 
terms the conception of democratic self-government that underlies its 
decision to include that value as one of the philosophical rationales 
underlying section 2(b). It has preferred to proceed incrementally, on a 
case by case basis, as Lamer C.J.C. suggested it would when he prof-
fered a cautious approach to defining the reach of all three of the values 
said to underpin freedom of expression in the Prostitution Reference;101 
as he put it, “… the precise articulation of what kinds of activities promote 
these values is a matter for judicial appreciation to be developed on an 
ongoing basis”.102 
                                                                                                             
100 Supra, note 80, at 1336. 
101 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Prostitution Reference”]. 
102 Id., at 1187. 
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The Court has, of course, said a good deal about democracy as a con-
stitutional value in other contexts. In the Reference re Secession of 
Quebec,103 in which the Court included democracy as one of the organiz-
ing or underlying principles of Canada’s constitution, it listed the follow-
ing as significant features of what it termed the “institutional dimension” 
of Canadian democracy — representative government, popular franchise, 
responsible government, majority rule, the ascertainment and implemen-
tation of the “sovereign will”, self-government, accountability, consent of 
the governed, “compromise, negotiation, and deliberation”, and the 
accommodation of dissenting voices.104 The “individual dimension” was 
said to comprise the rights to vote and stand for election mentioned in 
section 3 of the Charter.105 The Court has also offered some thoughts on 
the meaning of the term “free and democratic society” in section 1. In 
Oakes, Dickson C.J.C. included among “the values and principles 
essential to a free and democratic society” “respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, 
accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and 
group identity, and faith in social and political institutions which enhance 
the participation of individuals and groups in society”.106 Given that this 
list was intended to capture the elements of two distinct (even if closely 
related) concepts, freedom and democracy, it would be wrong to assume 
that all of the principles included in it were directed at both. It seems 
reasonable to infer, however, that “accommodation of a wide variety of 
beliefs” and “faith in social and political institutions which enhance the 
participation of individuals and groups within society” were directed 
primarily at the democracy component. The concept of democracy has 
also been discussed in cases involving denials of the right to vote in 
section 3 of the Charter. In the course of striking down federal legislation 
removing the right to vote of persons imprisoned for more than two years 
in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer),107 McLachlin C.J.C. invoked 
“universal suffrage”, “inclusiveness, equality, and citizen participation”, 
and “respect for the dignity of every person” as integral features of 
Canadian democracy.108 
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The Court does not appear to have drawn explicitly on any of these 
sources in developing its understanding of democracy for the purposes of 
section 2(b). However, as we will see, it has adopted as one of the more 
important elements of that understanding the notion of broadly based 
participation in social and political institutions. That is clearly evident in 
the alternative formulation of the value found in cases like Irwin Toy, 
where the Court replaced the language of democratic self-government that 
it had used in Ford with “participation in social and political decision-
making is to be fostered and encouraged”.109 But it is also evident in the 
strong commitment that the Court has shown at the section 1 stage in cases 
like Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)110 to the principle of equality of 
access to the political process, evidence of which we will see below. 
(a) All Public Institutions 
The expressive interest at issue in the Reference re Alberta Statutes 
— the ability of privately owned newspapers in the province of Alberta 
to criticize the policies of that province’s government without impedi-
ment — provides a good example of an expressive activity to which the 
“truly integral to democratic self-government” characterization could be 
given. If any kind of expression can be said to lie at the “core” of free-
dom of expression, surely it can. It might be thought to be less obvious 
that the activity at issue in Edmonton Journal — the ability of the media 
to cover court proceedings — does so, if only because democracy tends 
to be associated in common parlance with the legislative and executive 
branches of government rather than the judicial branch, which we 
associate with different values like judicial independence and the rule of 
law. Yet Cory J. clearly saw that ability, too, as furthering the cause of 
self-government. His reference to “the functioning of public institutions” 
in the above passage indicates that, at least for this purpose, he was of the 
view that democracy should be understood to extend to all three branches 
of government. There is strong implicit support for that view in the 
Quebec Secession Reference, where the Court said that “… democracy in 
any real sense of the word cannot exist without the rule of law. It is the 
law that creates the framework within which the ‘sovereign will’ is to be 
ascertained and implemented.”111 And while he made no reference to that 
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passage, Cory J. did connect the two values when he said: “It is also 
essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are 
seen to function openly.”112  
Confirmation that the Court’s conception of democracy for this pur-
pose extends to the functioning of all public institutions has been pro-
vided by subsequent cases. Insofar as the courts are concerned, a 
frequently cited authority is Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New 
Brunswick (Attorney General),113 in which La Forest J., speaking for the 
Court, explicitly linked “public scrutiny of the criminal courts” to “the 
concept of representative democracy”, and noted that “[t]he freedom of 
individuals to discuss information about the institutions of government, 
their policies and practices, is crucial to the notion of democratic rule”.114 
That same thinking is clearly reflected in the Court’s decision in the 
Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. case,115 in which the government institutions 
were the police and Crown prosecutors. As noted above, the Court in that 
case incorporated the values underlying freedom of expression into its 
approach to claims of access to government-held documents. That 
approach requires the claimant to show, as a first step, that the expressive 
activity to which it is said the documents in question will contribute 
furthers one of the values, which will “usually” be “discussion on matters 
of public importance”. In that particular case, the Court quickly accepted 
that the required linkage had been established, on the basis that the 
documents in question were going to be used by the claimant in a cri-
tique of the conduct of the police and prosecutors in a criminal case of 
some notoriety, and that the police and prosecutorial service were both 
“public institutions” the conduct of which was clearly a proper subject of 
free and open discussion.  
(b)  Expression Within the Electoral Process 
It will be recalled that McLachlin J. in Keegstra suggested that the 
democratic self-government rationale captured a narrow range of expres-
sive activities — in her terms, only “expression relating to the political 
process”.116 She did not offer a definition of the “political process” in 
that case, but had she, it would certainly have caught the conduct of, and 
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participation in, elections. Hence, it was to be expected that the Court 
would hold, as it has, that democratic self-government protects the ability 
of the media to publish the results of election polls close to the date of an 
election, as well as the ability of both the media and private individuals 
to publicize the results of a federal election in parts of the country in 
which the polls have closed to people residing in parts of the country in 
which they remain open. Political opinion polls were described by 
Justice Bastarache in his majority reasons for judgment in Thomson 
Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)117 as “political informa-
tion”, and of that kind of information, he said,  
[w]hile opinion polls may not be the same as political ideas, they are 
nevertheless an important part of the political discourse, as manifested 
by the attention such polls receive in the media and in the public at 
large, and by the fact that political parties themselves purchase and use 
such information.118  
(Justice Gonthier, in his dissent in that case, was less enthusiastic about 
the status of polls, suggesting that they “tend to reduce the level of 
political discourse to the lowest common denominator: principles are 
sacrificed for percentage points.”119) And the publication of election 
results was said by Bastarache J. in his majority reasons in R. v. Bryan120 
also to form part of that core, on the basis that “election results are of 
fundamental importance in a free and democratic society”.121 Abella J., in 
her dissenting reasons in that case, also placed the publication of election 
results at the core of section 2(b), and said that “[i]t is difficult to imagine 
a more important aspect of democratic expression than voting and 
learning the results of [one’s] vote”.122 
The Court’s conception of democratic self-government also includes 
the ability of individuals and artificial legal entities to spend money in 
support of both political causes and political parties. That it should do so 
was accepted virtually without discussion in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney 
General),123 in which the Court was asked to (and did) strike down 
provincial legislation that imposed strict limits on the ability of Quebe-
cers to spend money in support of their position on the issues placed 
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before the residents of that province in a referendum. Spending money in 
support of a political position was said by the Court to constitute “a form 
of political expression that is clearly protected by s. 2(b) of the Canadian 
Charter”.124 The possibility that expression in support of a political 
position could be kept analytically distinct from the expenditure of 
money to pay for the communication of that expression, with the former 
being protected and the latter not, appears not to have been considered. A 
justification for the view articulated in Libman was provided in a later 
case, however. It came in the dissenting opinion (but not on this point) of 
McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. in Harper, which dealt with limits on the 
ability of “third parties” to spend money in support of political parties 
and political causes during a federal election. That justification was 
founded on the conviction that section 2(b) should be understood to 
protect, not just the right to communicate, but the right to communicate 
effectively: 
In the democracy of ancient Athens, all citizens were able to meet and 
discuss the issues of the day in person. In our modern democracy, we 
cannot speak personally with each of our fellow citizens. We can 
convey our message only through methods of mass communication. 
Advertising through mail-outs and the media is one of the most 
effective means of communication on a large scale. We need only look 
at the reliance of political parties on advertising to realize how 
important it is to actually reaching citizens — in a word, to effective 
participation. The ability to speak in one’s own home or on a remote 
street corner does not fulfill the objective of the guarantee of freedom 
of expression, which is that each citizen be afforded the opportunity to 
present her views for public consumption and attempt to persuade her 
fellow citizens.125 
The same concern about effective communication within the political 
realm is, it should be noted, evident in some of the early cases dealing 
with claims under section 2(b) for access to public property for expres-
sive purposes, but on behalf of the poor rather than the wealthy. Hence, 
in Ramsden,126 Iacobucci J. quoted a lengthy passage from a book by an 
art historian in which it was noted that posters have always been “an 
effective and inexpensive way of reaching a large number of persons”, 
and have been called “the circulating libraries of the poor”.127  
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(c) Discussion of Matters of Public Interest 
Expressive activities associated with the scrutiny of public institu-
tions and the electoral process are not the only kinds of expression that 
the Court has seen fit to link to the self-government rationale. Discussion 
of matters of public interest has also been linked to it. In Grant v. Tor-
star,128 in which the Court introduced the defence of responsible com-
munication on matters of public interest to the law of defamation, 
McLachlin C.J.C. said that “respect for vigorous debate on matters of 
public interest [has] long been seen as fundamental to Canadian democ-
racy”,129 citing in support Rand J.’s assertion in 1957 in Switzman v. 
Elbling130 to the effect that “government by the free public opinion of an 
open society … demands the condition of a virtually unobstructed access 
to a diffusion of ideas”.131 Whether or not expression relating to such 
matters fits within McLachlin J.’s conception of “the political process” as 
she used that term in Keegstra, when she said that the democratic self-
government rationale protected a limited range of expressive activities, 
cannot be known. It seems clear, however, that including all such expres-
sion under that rubric does have the effect of bringing a potentially very 
broad range of expressive activities under its protective mantle.  
Chief Justice McLachlin made it clear in Grant v. Torstar that com-
munications on matters of public interest that contain “false imputations” 
about other people — the basis of the claim for damages in that case — 
are entitled to the benefit of the link to democratic self-government.132 
Her statement to that effect, it should be noted, is difficult to reconcile 
with earlier pronouncements made by Cory J. in two other cases involv-
ing defamatory speech. In Hill,133 in which, as noted above, the Court 
was asked — but refused — to refashion the defence of qualified privi-
lege to better protect freedom of expression, Cory J., speaking for the 
Court, said that “false and injurious statements” cannot be said to “lead 
to healthy participation in the affairs of the community”.134 He repeated 
that statement in his reasons for judgment in R. v. Lucas,135 in which the 
Court rejected a challenge to the defamatory libel offence in the Criminal 
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Code.136 The implication of that statement appeared to be that defamatory 
falsehoods cannot be connected to the self-government rationale. If that 
was the implication, it now has to be understood to come with a signifi-
cant qualification: defamatory falsehoods that form part of a communica-
tion on a matter of public interest can claim the benefit of that 
connection. Only those defamatory falsehoods that do not form part of 
such a communication remain excluded. 
That McLachlin C.J.C. should have extended the reach of the self-
government rationale to include communications on matters of public 
interest that contain “false imputations” is not surprising, given her 
holding in Zundel137 that the ability to use deliberate falsehoods in the 
course of a political debate is protected by that rationale. The reasoning 
she relied on in support of that holding was as follows:  
Exaggeration — even clear falsification — may arguably serve useful 
social purposes linked to the values underlying freedom of expression. 
A person fighting cruelty against animals may knowingly cite false 
statistics in pursuit of his or her beliefs and with the purpose of 
communicating a more fundamental message, e.g., “cruelty to animals 
is increasing and must be stopped”. A doctor, in order to persuade 
people to be inoculated against a burgeoning epidemic, may exaggerate 
the number or geographical location of persons potentially infected 
with the virus. An artist, for artistic purposes, may make a statement 
that a particular society considers both an assertion of fact and a 
manifestly deliberate lie; consider the case of Salman Rushdie’s 
Satanic Verses, viewed by many Muslim societies as perpetrating 
deliberate lies against the Prophet. 
All of this expression arguably has intrinsic value in fostering political 
participation and individual self-fulfillment. …138 
Justice McLachlin also referred in support of her conclusion on this 
point in Zundel to two previous prosecutions under the false news 
provision, both of which she said involved expression that served the 
self-government rationale by promoting political debate on matters of 
public interest. One of these prosecutions was unsuccessful,139 but the 
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other — for a publication containing the statement “Americans not 
wanted in Canada” — resulted in a conviction.140  
The Court has not shed a great deal of light on the important question 
of what counts as a “matter of public interest” for this purpose, but the 
light it has shed suggests that it has an exceedingly broad understanding 
of the term. In Grant v. Torstar, McLachlin C.J.C. said the following: 
 To be of public interest, the subject matter “must be shown to be 
one inviting public attention, or about which the public has some 
substantial concern because it affects the welfare of citizens, or one to 
which considerable public notoriety or controversy has attached”: … 
The case law on fair comment “is replete with successful fair comment 
defences on matters ranging from politics to restaurant and book 
reviews”: … Public interest may be a function of the prominence of the 
person referred to in the communication, but mere curiosity or prurient 
interest is not enough. Some segment of the public must have a genuine 
stake in knowing about the matter published.  
 Public interest is not confined to publications on government and 
political matters, as it is in Australia and New Zealand. Nor is it 
necessary that the plaintiff be a “public figure”, as in the American 
jurisprudence since Sullivan. Both qualifications cast the public interest 
too narrowly. The public has a genuine stake in knowing about many 
matters, ranging from science and the arts to the environment, religion, 
and morality. The democratic interest in such wide-ranging public 
debate must be reflected in the jurisprudence.141 
One suspects that the breadth of the understanding of “matter of pub-
lic interest” articulated in this passage reflects the fact that the Chief 
Justice’s primary interest when she crafted it was in defining the reach of 
the new defence to defamation claims that the Court was creating rather 
than in defining the reach of the democratic self-government rationale for 
freedom of expression, and that the Court might wish to reconsider that 
understanding if and when it is called upon to undertake the latter task. It 
is difficult, for example, to see how reviews of restaurants, which the 
Court sees as potentially falling within the reach of that new defence, 
could possibly be said to be relevant to self-government (unless, of 
course, the reviews related to concerns about a failure on the part of 
government to properly regulate the industry). It is also difficult to see 
how such a broad conception of “matter of public interest” can be 
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reconciled with the view expressed by McLachlin J. in Keegstra that the 
self-government rationale only protects expressive activities relating to 
the political process; that understanding of “matter of public interest” 
aligns more closely with the understanding given to it in the law of 
defamation applied in Australia and New Zealand. This is another area in 
which, it would appear, the Court has more explanatory work to do. 
In Grant v. Torstar itself, it should be noted, the subject matter of the 
communication that formed the basis of the claim in defamation was 
opposition to a plan to construct a private golf course on lakefront 
property owned by the plaintiff, and in particular suggestions that the 
plaintiff might have been using his political connections with the provin-
cial government of the day to get the necessary approvals. That subject 
matter would clearly have satisfied even the narrow understanding of 
“matter of public interest” that holds sway in Australia and New Zealand, 
since it related to “government and political matters”.  
(d) Lessons from Access to Public Property Cases 
Apart from one short passage, the five judgments rendered by the 
Court in the area of access to public property for expressive purposes add 
little of any significance to our understanding of its conception of de-
mocratic self-government. In fact, the only other contribution they make 
is to add to the list of protected interests the ability to hold up political 
placards and distribute political leaflets, hardly a surprising addition. 
That contribution was made in the reasons for judgment of McLachlin J. 
(as she then was) in the Committee for the Commonwealth case.142  
It was in that same set of reasons that the noteworthy passage, which 
contains obiter comments about the implications of her analytical ap-
proach in other contexts, is found. Justice McLachlin made these com-
ments in the course of justifying that approach as the reasonable middle 
ground between what she perceived to be the overly restrictive approach 
adopted by Lamer C.J.C. and the overly generous approach preferred by 
L’Heureux-Dubé J. After noting, in keeping with the cautious views 
expressed by the majority in Irwin Toy, that the reach of the rationales (in 
her terms, “purposes”) would be worked out over time on a case by case 
basis, she asserted that: 
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It would be difficult to contend that these purposes are served by 
“public” expression in the sanctum of the Prime Minister’s office, an 
airport control tower, a prison cell or a judge’s private chambers, to 
return to examples where it seems self-evident that the guarantee of 
free expression has no place. These are not places of public debate 
aimed at promoting either the truth or a better understanding of social 
and political issues. Nor is expression in these places related to the 
open and welcoming environment essential to maximization of 
individual fulfillment and human flourishing.143 
She suggested, by contrast, that “the use of places which have by 
tradition or designation been dedicated to public expression for purposes 
of discussing political or social or artistic issues” would clearly seem to 
be linked to the values underlying the guarantee of free speech.144 
(e) Lessons from Section 1: Democracy and Equality 
The Court’s understanding of democratic self-government is also re-
flected in its application of section 1 in a number of section 2(b) cases, 
particularly those in which the government has relied on the principle of 
equality to justify a limitation on freedom of expression. When, in 
Keegstra,145 Dickson C.J.C. came to measure hate speech against the 
self-government rationale at the section 1 stage, he identified two aspects 
of the link between the two. One was explicitly functional, and bears a 
close resemblance to the advancement of knowledge and truth rationale, 
as applied to the political sphere — freedom of expression, he said, 
“permits the best policies to be chosen from among a wide array of 
proffered options”.146 The other was tied to the democratic commitment 
to equal participation in public decision-making. Freedom of expression, 
he said, “helps to ensure that participation in the political process is open 
to all persons”, because it is fundamental to democracy that “all persons 
are equally deserving of respect and dignity”.147  
Chief Justice Dickson acknowledged that the hate propaganda provi-
sions of the Criminal Code operate to limit the participation of some — 
“a few individuals” — in the political process, but said that that limitation 
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“is not substantial”.148 He also acknowledged that hate propaganda can 
fairly be described as “political speech” and therefore to lie at or near the 
core of the expression protected by section 2(b). But, he contended, hate 
propaganda, by “arguing ... for a society in which the democratic process 
is subverted and individuals are denied respect and dignity simply 
because of racial and religious characteristics”, operates “to undermine 
our commitment to democracy”.149 He concluded by observing that, 
while he was “very reluctant to attach anything but the highest impor-
tance to expression relevant to political matters ... given the unparalleled 
vigour with which hate propaganda repudiates and undermines democ-
ratic values, and in particular its condemnation of the view that all 
citizens need be treated with equal respect and dignity so as to make 
participation in the political process meaningful”, he was “unable to see 
the protection of such expression as integral to the democratic ideal so 
central to the s. 2(b) rationale”.150 Justice La Forest, speaking for the 
Court, used similar language in Ross v. New Brunswick School District 
No. 15151 in assessing the freedom of expression interest of a teacher who 
had lost his job because of his extracurricular anti-Semitic writings: “The 
respondent’s expression is expression that undermines democratic values 
in its condemnation of Jews and the Jewish faith. It impedes meaningful 
participation in social and political decision-making by Jews, an end 
wholly antithetical to the democratic process.”152 
The Court has adopted a similarly egalitarian conception of freedom 
of expression’s contribution to democracy in evaluating the justifiability 
of limits on expressive activities related to the conduct of referenda and 
elections. In this context, the concern has been with equality of access on 
economic and geographic rather than racial and religious grounds. 
Hence, while the Court struck down the spending restrictions in Libman, 
it made it clear that it considered the purpose underlying those restric-
tions, which it said was “to guarantee the democratic nature of referen-
dums by promoting equality between the options submitted by the 
government and seeking to promote free and informed voting”,153 to be a 
very important one, and one that would have justified a more carefully 
drawn set of restrictions. “Freedom of political expression”, the Court 
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said, “… would lose much value if it could only be exercised in a context 
in which the economic power of the most affluent members of society 
constituted the ultimate guidepost of our political choices”.154 And the 
spending restrictions at issue in Harper,155 as well as the prohibition 
against publishing election results before all polls were closed at issue in 
Bryan,156 were upheld, in whole or in part, on the basis of that same 
principle.  
In effect, what the Court has done in the cases in which it has em-
ployed egalitarian principles to justify infringements on “political 
speech” is make an assessment that, on balance, those infringements 
serve to enhance rather than detract from the proper functioning of our 
system of government. While on one level, the conflict in such cases can 
be understood to be between liberty and equality, on another it can be 
understood to be between two different conceptions of democracy, at 
least at the level of process. Under one, the state plays a limited role in 
seeking to compensate for real and potential inequalities in access to the 
political marketplace of ideas and other relevant knowledge; under the 
other, the state plays an active role in seeking to address those inequali-
ties. Neither of the competing conceptions of democracy discounts the 
merits of the other in their entirety — as the result in Libman shows, if 
the Court is of the view that the government has gone too far in seeking 
to impose its preferred conception on the electorate, it will strike the 
legislation down. However, it is fair to say that, at least to this point, the 
Court has demonstrated a strong commitment to the latter, egalitarian 
version.157 
(f)  What Is Not Included 
The Court’s conception of democratic self-government has also been 
shaped by decisions that certain kinds of expressive activities are not 
connected to it. Commercial expression appears to fall into that category. 
While the Court in Ford158 held that commercial expression is protected 
by section 2(b), it did so on the basis of the relationship between that 
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kind of expression and the self-realization rationale. And while the Court 
made no explicit holding that commercial expression does not further the 
democratic self-government rationale, the failure to mention it suggested 
that the Court did not see it as being engaged by commercial expression. 
In later cases, at the section 1 stage, members of the Court have explic-
itly addressed the question of whether or not commercial expression does 
further that rationale, and have held that it does not. For example, in 
Rocket, McLachlin J. had this to say about the negative consequences to 
dentists of the prohibition against advertising that was at issue: “their 
loss … is merely loss of profit, and not loss of opportunity to participate in 
the political process. …”159 And in RJR, La Forest J. (in his dissenting 
reasons for judgment, but not dissenting on this point) said of the tobacco 
advertising there at issue, that it “[does not] promote participation in the 
political process”.160  
Obscenity also appears to fall into this category. Prohibitions against 
obscene speech have been before the Court in two cases, Butler161 and 
Little Sisters.162 In Butler, a unanimous Court upheld the critical compo-
nents of the Criminal Code provisions relating to obscenity (albeit in two 
different sets of reasons).163 As it had done two years previously in 
Keegstra, the Court integrated into its section 1 analysis a consideration 
of the relationship between the kind of expression proscribed by these 
provisions and the rationales for protecting freedom of expression. After 
reciting the rationales, Sopinka J. noted the contention by one of the 
intervening provincial attorneys-general that “only ‘individual self-
fulfillment’, and only in its most base aspect, that of physical arousal, is 
engaged by pornography”.164 He then adverted to a submission from an 
intervening civil liberties organization to the effect that “pornography 
forces us to question conventional notions of sexuality and thereby 
launches us into an inherently political discourse”.165 It seems clear from 
the conclusion at which he eventually arrived that he rejected the latter 
submission, but his reasons for doing so are far from clear. He said that 
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the Code provision, properly understood, does not catch “good pornog-
raphy,” and that its purpose “is not to inhibit the celebration of human 
sexuality”.166 He then noted that “the realities of the pornography indus-
try are far from the picture [suggested by this submission]” — those 
realities, he said, involve the depiction of human beings, especially 
women, in dehumanizing and degrading sexual behaviour.167 Such 
expression, he argued, “does not stand on an equal footing with other 
kinds of expression which directly engage the ‘core’ of the freedom of 
expression values”, an assessment that “is further buttressed by the fact 
that the targeted material is expression which is motivated, in the over-
whelming majority of cases, by economic profit”.168 Then, further on in 
his reasons — and it is here that we are given his ultimate conclusion, 
both with respect to the civil liberties organization’s submission and with 
respect to the contention of the provincial attorney-general — he said, 
“this kind of expression lies far from the core of the guarantee of free-
dom of expression. It appeals only to the most base aspect of individual 
fulfillment, and it is primarily economically motivated.”169  
Child pornography can probably also be added to this list. In 
Sharpe,170 McLachlin C.J.C. noted that that kind of expression “does not 
generally contribute to … Canadian social and political discourse”.171 In 
their concurring reasons in that case, L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and 
Bastarache JJ. were more categorical on the issue, asserting that “there is 
no link between the possession of ‘child pornography’ (as defined in 
section 163.1(1)) and participation in the political process”.172 They drew 
on Dickson C.J.C.’s judgment in Keegstra in support of their position 
that “messages of degradation, which undermine the dignity and equality 
of members of identifiable groups, subvert the democratic aspirations of 
the expression guarantee by undermining the participation of those 
groups in the political process”.173  
Finally, and to repeat the analysis provided above in relation to the 
status of defamatory speech in this context, it would appear from the  
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reasons for judgment of Cory J. in Hill174 and Lucas,175 as qualified by 
those of McLachlin C.J.C. in Grant v. Torstar,176 that defamatory false-
hoods that do not form part of a communication on a matter of public 
interest are also to be excluded.  
(g)  Varying Degrees of Importance 
The decision in Edmonton Journal177 did more than expand the 
meaning of democratic self-government to include all governmental 
institutions. It also suggested that not all expressive activities that can be 
said to further that value — hence, not all “political speech” — will be 
considered by the Court to be of equal importance. It will be recalled that 
the expressive activity at issue in that case was the ability of the media to 
cover the resolution by courts of matrimonial disputes. While Cory J. and 
the three other members of the Court who concurred with his judgment 
showed no interest in distinguishing between media coverage of matri-
monial disputes and media coverage of other kinds of disputes, the three 
dissenting judges did. They suggested that media coverage of matrimo-
nial disputes was less important because there was little to be gained in 
terms of the broader public interest from the disclosure by the media of 
the highly personal and often sensitive evidence given by the parties to 
such disputes. It is fair to say, moreover, that the differing approaches the 
two groups of judges took to that issue played a role in the differing 
results at which they arrived on the ultimate question the case raised; the 
majority voted to strike the impugned legislation down, while the dis-
senting judges voted to uphold it. 
Importantly for our purposes, the minority view on that issue in Ed-
monton Journal — that the importance of public scrutiny of court 
proceedings can vary depending on the type of dispute being scrutinized 
— was subsequently adopted by the full Court in Sierra Club.178 It will 
be recalled that the Court had been asked in that case — and agreed — to 
issue a confidentiality order in respect of certain documentary evidence 
in a judicial review application. The ability of the public to scrutinize court 
proceedings, which was seen, as it was in Edmonton Journal, to be con-
nected to the self-government rationale, was one of the factors taken into 
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account by the Court when it decided whether or not to issue the confiden-
tiality order. In the course of considering that factor, Iacobucci J. said:  
It is important to note that this core value will always be engaged where 
the open court principle is engaged owing to the importance of open 
justice to a democratic society. However, where the political process is 
also engaged by the substance of the proceedings, the connection 
between open proceedings and public participation in the political 
process will increase.179  
And, he then added:  
… by their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public 
import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental 
issues will generally attract a high degree of protection. In this regard, 
… the public interest is engaged here more than it would be if this were 
an action between private parties relating to purely private interests.180  
Finally, it is worth noting that L’Heureux-Dubé J., in her concur-
ring reasons in Committee for the Commonwealth, took pains to point 
out that “political expression” is not a distinct category of expression, 
subject to its own set of tests. As she put it, “the political nature of the 
speech at issue merely focuses on the competing interests that must be 
balanced on the constitutional scales”.181 While that proposition does 
not require drawing the kinds of distinctions that the dissenting judges 
drew in Edmonton Journal and that Iacobucci J. drew in Sierra Club, it 
certainly permits doing so. 
(h)  The Role of Rationality 
The Court has paid little attention to the question of whether or not 
evidence that people will not respond rationally to “political speech” 
should have a bearing on the weight to be given it in the balancing 
process. In Thomson Newspapers, Bastarache J. said that “The presump-
tion in this Court should be that the Canadian voter is a rational actor 
who can learn from experience and make independent judgments about 
the value of particular sources of electoral information.”182 The implica-
tion of that statement might be taken to be that, if that presumption can 
be rebutted by reliable evidence (which Bastarache J. found not to have 
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occurred in that case), the value of the speech in question will diminish. 
But that may be to read too much into the statement. However, as we will 
soon see, the Court has acted on concerns about rationality when assess-
ing the weight to be given to expressive activities linked to the advance-
ment of truth and knowledge. If it is going to act on those concerns in 
that context, it would be surprising if it did not also do so in this one. 
(i) Summary 
The Court has yet to provide a comprehensive theory of democratic 
self-government to ground its understanding of the reach of the self-
government rationale. The absence of such a theory has not, however, 
prevented it from bringing a range of different kinds of expression within 
its reach, including expression relating to the functioning of all public 
institutions, the electoral process, and “matters of public interest”. Nor 
has the absence of such a theory prevented the Court from holding that 
this rationale does not capture a range of other kinds of expression, in 
particular, commercial expression, obscenity, child pornography and 
deliberate falsehoods that do not form part of a communication on a 
matter of public interest. The Court has also indicated that not all of the 
expressive activities captured by this rationale are entitled to the same 
degree of protection. The factors relevant to determining the appropriate 
degree of protection to give particular kinds of such expression appear to 
include the extent to which the expressive activity in question is consis-
tent with equality of access to the political process, the importance to the 
general public of the subject matter of the communication in question, 
and (probably) the extent to which it is likely that the communication 
will elicit a rational response from those who read or hear it. Finally, 
there is support within the Court’s jurisprudence for the proposition that 
the protection afforded by this rationale may be lost if the claimant 
engages in the protected expressive activity in question in or on certain 
kinds of public property. 
2.  Advancement of Truth and Knowledge 
This value raises a somewhat different set of questions than the other 
two because the meanings of truth and knowledge are not at issue in the 
same way that the meanings of democracy and self-realization are. What 
is at issue in relation to this value is (1) the kinds of expressive activities 
486 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 59 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
that can be said to contribute in a meaningful way to the advancement of 
truth and knowledge; and (2) whether or not reliance on the advancement 
of truth and knowledge rationale is weakened if the Court concludes that, 
in the particular context in question, the “marketplace of ideas” cannot 
for some reason be trusted to generate truth and enhance knowledge. In 
relation to the second of these questions, it will be recalled that McLach-
lin J. in Keegstra acknowledged that “freedom of expression provides no 
guarantee that the truth will always prevail”.183 The only explanation she 
proffered for that acknowledgement was the lessons that history has 
taught us: as she put it, “Indeed, as history attests, it is quite possible that 
dangerous, destructive and inherently untrue ideas may prevail, at least in 
the short run.”184 But if one understands this rationale to be premised on 
the assumptions (a) that the “marketplace of ideas” will be equally open 
to all who wish to participate in it and (b) that most if not all of the 
participants will adopt a rational approach to the issues under discussion, 
it is not difficult to propose other explanations for doubting that truth will 
always prevail. Courts should clearly be dubious about the ability of that 
marketplace to advance the cause of enhancing truth and knowledge in 
circumstances in which one or other of those assumptions can be said not 
to hold true. 
(a)  What Is Included 
The Court has said little to this point about what kinds of expression 
it believes make a useful contribution to the attainment of truth and 
knowledge. Chief Justice McLachlin made it clear in Grant v. Torstar 
that, on a general level, participation in “any area of debate where truth is 
sought through the exchange of information and ideas”185 does so. That 
clearly casts the net very broadly, bringing within the protected sphere 
debates about everything from the hard sciences to art appreciation, and 
business management to religion.  
On a much narrower level, the Court has also suggested that “con-
sumer advertising” — criticism by consumers of goods and services 
available in the marketplace — contributes to the attainment of truth and 
knowledge. Justice LeBel, speaking for the Court in R. v. Guignard,186 said 
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of such criticism that “it is a form of the expression of opinion that has an 
important effect on the social and economic life of a society”.187 I say 
“suggested” because LeBel J. does not mention truth and knowledge in 
that part of his judgment; however, the language he used to describe the 
benefit to society of such criticism makes it reasonable to infer that he had 
that value in mind. And there is abundant authority supporting the proposi-
tion that restrictions on the ability of the parties to court proceedings to 
adduce relevant viva voce and documentary evidence will adversely affect 
the search for truth within the narrow confines of such proceedings. For 
example, Iacobucci J. noted in Sierra Club that, “by facilitating access to 
relevant documents in a judicial proceeding, the [confidentiality] order 
sought [by the respondent in that case] would assist in the search for truth, 
a core value underlying freedom of expression”.188 And, finally, the Court 
in Keegstra189 was unanimous in holding that hate speech also qualifies 
under this rubric, albeit, as we will soon see, only barely in the minds of 
Dickson C.J.C. and the other majority judges. 
(b) What Is Not Included 
If the Court has shed little light on what kinds of expression do con-
tribute to the attainment of truth and knowledge, it has shed a fair bit of 
light on the kinds of expression that it believes do not do so. Commercial 
expression, obscenity and child pornography have all been held to fall 
within this excluded category. In the case of commercial expression, this 
was left to inference in Ford,190 but it has been made explicit in later cases. 
Hence in Rocket, McLachlin J. said that advertising by dentists made no 
contribution to the “marketplace of ideas”,191 and in his dissenting reasons 
in RJR (but not on this point), La Forest J. said of tobacco advertising that 
it “serves no … scientific or artistic ends”.192 Obscene speech and child 
pornography have been dealt with in much the same way. In Butler, 
Sopinka J. held that the only rationale to which obscene speech is con-
nected is individual self-realization.193 In Sharpe, McLachlin C.J.C. said in 
her majority reasons that “Child pornography does not generally contribute 
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to the search for truth …,”194 and L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and Basta-
rache JJ. in their concurring reasons expressed the view that “child pornog-
raphy contributes nothing to the search for truth … [because] it perpetuates 
lies about children’s humanity … [and] promotes the false view that 
children are appropriate sexual partners [for adults]”.195 (It is worth noting 
that, in his dissenting reasons (but not on this point) in Little Sisters, 
Iacobucci J. accepted that sexual material that falls short of being obscene 
can serve the goal of challenging “the dominant society and culture”,196 
which suggests that he saw such material as arguably furthering the cause 
of enhanced truth and knowledge.) 
It appeared from Zundel that deliberate lies were not seen by the 
Court as furthering the attainment of truth and knowledge. Justices Cory 
and Iacobucci, in their dissenting reasons for judgment in that case, were 
explicit about this, saying that “The publication of deliberate lies is 
obviously the antithesis of the truth,” and that the need to protect speech 
in order to avoid losing even a kernel of truth is insufficient when “there 
is no possibility that speech may be true because even its source has 
knowledge of its falsity”.197 Justice McLachlin, for the majority, was not 
explicit on the question, but implied that that was also her position, 
because, as we saw above, her holding that deliberate lies were protected 
by section 2(b) was based on the conviction that they had the potential to 
further the democratic self-government and self-realization rationales; 
she made no reference to the advancement of truth and knowledge.198 
However, given the recent decision in Grant v. Torstar,199 in which, as 
just noted, the Court accepted that defamatory communications on 
matters of public interest can contribute to the attainment of truth and 
knowledge, the status of deliberate lies in relation to that rationale has 
become clouded. If a media outlet deliberately lies about a public figure 
in the course of defaming him or her, must we now assume that that lie 
will be seen to further the cause of truth and knowledge (as well as 
furthering the cause of democratic self-government)? Or do deliberate 
lies remain outside the sphere of expression protected by that rationale?  
This means that the status of defamatory falsehoods — a category of 
expression that overlaps but is not co-terminous with deliberate lies — 
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has also become somewhat clouded in this regard. Hill and Lucas placed 
them clearly in the excluded category: they were said by Cory J. in the 
former — an assessment he repeated in the latter — to be “inimical to the 
search for truth”.200 Again, however, Grant v. Torstar tells us that at least 
some defamatory falsehoods, those communicated on matters of public 
interest, are to be seen as furthering the cause of enhanced truth and 
knowledge.201 It remains to be seen whether all defamatory falsehoods 
are now to be seen in the same light, thereby overriding the earlier 
pronouncements in Hill and Lucas, or whether those that were not the 
focus of the Court’s attention in that case remain excluded.  
(c) Varying Degrees of Truthfulness 
Chief Justice Dickson in Keegstra did not have to address the ques-
tion of whether or not deliberate lies could be said to further the ad-
vancement of truth and knowledge rationale. However, his analysis of 
the connection between hate propaganda and that rationale strongly 
suggests that, from his standpoint, the less likely it is that a particular 
message is truthful, the less useful it will be in furthering truth and 
knowledge, and on that basis, he held that “the argument from truth 
does not provide convincing support for the protection of hate propa-
ganda.”202 While recognizing that “truth and the ideal form of political 
and social organization can rarely, if at all, be identified with absolute 
certainty”, and hence that “it is difficult to prohibit expression without 
impeding the free exchange of potentially valuable information”,203 he 
refused to accept that governments must therefore be barred from 
imposing any constraints whatsoever on expressive activity. That is in 
part, he argued, because we can be more certain about some things than 
others, and to the extent that we can be reasonably certain that speech 
— an assertion of fact or the expression of an opinion — will not lead 
us closer to the truth or a better world, we risk little in suppressing it; 
and, he said, we can be reasonably certain that “statements intended to 
promote hatred against an identifiable group” are neither true nor likely 
to lead to a better world.204 Similar reasoning is found in La Forest J.’s 
reasons for judgment in Ross, another case in which hate speech was at 
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issue. In that case, however, the focus was on the silencing effect that 
hate speech can have on members of the target group. In his words, “to 
give protection to views that attack and condemn the views, beliefs and 
practices of others is to undermine the principle that all views deserve 
equal protection and muzzles the voice of truth”.205 
(d) The Role of Rationality 
The Court’s position on the question of whether or not the advance-
ment of truth and knowledge depends upon the exercise of human rational-
ity by the participants in the “marketplace of ideas” appears to be that it 
does, at least to the extent that expressive activities that elicit irrational 
responses will be given less weight in the balancing process than those that 
elicit rational ones. In Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, 
Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd.,206 McLachlin 
C.J.C. and LeBel J., speaking for the Court, stated in very explicit terms 
that “freedom of expression is not confined to ‘rational’ speech”, but then, 
in the very next sentence, acknowledged that “[i]rrationality may support 
according less protection to particular kinds of speech”.207 
The importance of rational discussion and debate to the achievement 
of truth and knowledge is perhaps most clearly acknowledged by Cory J., 
speaking for the Court in United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 
1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd.,208 which dealt with the constitutionality of 
legislation restricting the ability of workers to pass out leaflets in support 
of their cause in an employment dispute. Characterizing “informed and 
rational discourse” as “the very essence of freedom of expression”, he 
distinguished picketing, which “uses coercion and obedience to a picket 
line to impede public access to an enterprise”, and which is therefore 
entitled to limited protection under section 2(b), from consumer leaflet-
ing, which “attempts to rationally persuade consumers to take their 
business elsewhere”, and which is therefore entitled to a much higher 
degree of protection.209 That distinction, which was again noted in Pepsi-
Cola, played a significant role in his decision to strike down the im-
pugned legislation in KMart. 
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The notion that the presence or absence of rationality can have a 
bearing on the degree of protection afforded to a particular kind of 
expressive activity has been a feature of the Court’s approach to section 
2(b) since at least Keegstra. We have already noted that, when Dickson 
C.J.C. addressed the relationship between hate propaganda and the 
advancement of truth and knowledge, he expressed the view that the less 
likely it was that a particular message was true, the less likely it was that 
that message would contribute to the attainment of truth. He also thought 
it important to note that we cannot assume that all who hear hate propa-
ganda will respond rationally to it. As he put it, in more general terms, 
“neither should we overplay the view that rationality will overcome all 
falsehoods in the unregulated marketplace of ideas”.210 The clear impli-
cation of that statement is that, if the Court finds that the response to a 
particular message is unlikely to be a rational one, the connection be-
tween that message and the advancement of truth and knowledge will 
become a tenuous one, and the importance of protecting the right to 
convey — and be the recipient of — that message will diminish.211  
That same thinking is reflected in Sierra Club212 When Iacobucci J. 
came to assess the damage that would result from issuing the confidenti-
ality order sought by one of the parties to the cause of advancing truth 
and knowledge that comes from the ability of the public to scrutinize 
court proceedings, he concluded that it would be minimal because of the 
highly technical nature of the evidence in question. As he put it:  
[I]t is important to remember that the confidentiality order would 
restrict access to a relatively small number of highly technical 
documents. The nature of these documents is such that the general 
public would be unlikely to understand their contents, and thus they 
would contribute little to the public interest in the search for truth in 
this case.213  
The implication seems clearly to be that, to the extent that a particular 
audience is unlikely to be able to understand the contents of a particular 
message, and hence to respond to it rationally, the courts are entitled to 
conclude that the benefit to the public in terms of enhanced truth and 
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knowledge flowing from the communication of that message will be 
extremely limited. 
Justice Gonthier’s dissent in Thomson Newspapers214 contains another 
interesting application of the assumption of rationality. In his assessment 
of the justifiability of the prohibition against publishing poll results imme-
diately before an election that was at issue in that case, he suggested that it 
was the prohibition rather than the publication of those results that would 
better serve the cause of truth. In his words, “by allowing timely discus-
sion of all published poll results, s. 322.1 aims at fostering truth…”.215 In 
response to the majority reasons of Bastarache J., which argued for relying 
on other polls rather than state action to address concerns about the effect 
on the electorate of misleading poll results, Justice Gonthier said, “To say 
that truth most reliably emerges by means of correction through more polls 
is to assume an ongoing debate. In elections, the debate ends with the 
vote.”216 Both judges clearly assumed that rational discussion and debate 
play an important role in generating truth and knowledge; in Justice 
Gonthier’s case, the fact that, in his view, no such discussion and debate 
could take place in the circumstances in question was reason enough to 
allow the state to intervene in the marketplace. 
(e)  Inequality of Access to the “Marketplace of Ideas” 
I have not been able to find a case in which the Court has addressed 
the question of whether or not inequality of access to a particular “mar-
ketplace of ideas” will affect the weight given to an expressive activity to 
which the advancement of truth and knowledge is said to be relevant. 
However, the fact that, as we have seen above, the Court has adopted a 
highly egalitarian conception of democracy in cases like Libman and 
Harper suggests that it would be sympathetic to an argument that it 
should.217 Justice LeBel’s sensitivity in Guignard to “the importance of 
signs as an effective and inexpensive means of communication for 
individuals and groups that do not have sufficient economic resources”218 
would also support doing so, as would Cory J.’s assessment in KMart of 
leafleting and postering on the part of workers as serving as “particularly 
important means of providing information and seeking support by the 
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vulnerable and less powerful members of society”.219 And while it 
addresses the problem of inequality within the marketplace from a 
different perspective — focusing on outcome rather than access — so, 
too, arguably, does the following passage from the dissenting judgment 
of Cory and Iacobucci JJ. in Zundel: 
We are warned quite properly that history has many lessons to teach. 
One is that the marketplace of ideas is an inadequate model; another is 
that minorities are vulnerable to censure as speakers. … But history 
also teaches us that minorities have more often been the objects of 
speech than its subjects. To protect only the abstract right of minorities 
to speak without addressing the majoritarian background noise which 
makes it impossible for them to be heard is to engage in a partial 
analysis. This position ignores inequality among speakers and the 
inclination of listeners to believe messages which are already part of 
the dominant culture.220 
(f)  Summary 
The understanding that the Court is in the process of developing of the 
advancement of truth and knowledge rationale is one that includes protec-
tion at a general level for participation in “any area of debate where truth is 
sought through the exchange of information and ideas”, and at a more 
focused level, consumer expression, the adducing of evidence in court 
proceedings and hate propaganda, while denying protection to commercial 
expression, obscenity and child pornography, and leaving the status of the 
closely related categories of deliberate lies and defamatory falsehoods 
unclear. As with the self-government rationale, the Court seems clearly to 
be of the view that not all expression protected by this rationale is entitled 
to the same degree of protection, with the factors it considers to be relevant 
to determining the appropriate degree of protection to be afforded to a 
particular expressive activity including the extent to which the content of 
the message communicated can be said to be truthful, the likelihood that 
that activity will elicit rational responses and (possibly) the extent to which 
the particular marketplace to which that activity contributes can be said to 
be open to all. 
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3.  Individual Self-Realization 
The premise underlying the inclusion of self-realization as one of the 
values served by freedom of expression is that participating in communi-
cative activities with others, both as speakers and as listeners, serves to 
enhance the ability of people to realize their potential as human beings. 
As Cory and Iacobucci JJ. put it in their dissenting reasons for judgment 
(but not on this point) in Zundel:  
Liberal theory proposes that the state does not exist to designate and 
impose a single vision of the good life but to provide a forum in which 
opposing interests can engage in peaceful and reasoned struggle to 
articulate social and individual projects. We enshrine freedom of 
speech because it is an essential feature of humanity to reason and to 
choose and in order to allow our knowledge and our vision of the good 
to evolve.221  
But what is meant by terms like “potential as human beings” and “our 
vision of the good” in this context? Should it be taken to mean our 
potential or vision of the good in each and every aspect of our lives, or 
should it be limited to our potential in certain prescribed spheres? The 
intellectual sphere would seem to be a given, and the citizenship, spiri-
tual, artistic, health and social spheres would seem to be very strong 
candidates, but what about the financial, emotional and sexual spheres? 
Do we value freedom of expression because it assists human beings to 
make decisions about how to spend their money, to find emotional 
fulfillment and to satisfy their sexual proclivities? If we do, do we value 
it to the same degree as we do when it assists human beings in those 
other spheres? And again here, is it only enhancement through the 
exercise of our rational powers that counts, as Cory and Iacobucci JJ. 
suggest? Or does it matter how the enhancement is or might be achieved? 
Is an expressive activity that is likely to produce a purely emotional or 
instinctive response to be protected?  
It will be recalled that McLachlin J. expressed two concerns about 
the self-realization rationale in Keegstra in the course of her general 
discussion of the three values underlying freedom of expression. One 
was that it “is arguably too broad and amorphous to found constitutional 
principle”, and the other that “it does not answer the question of why 
expression should be deserving of special constitutional status, while 
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other self-fulfilling activities are not”.222 At least to this point, neither she 
nor any of her colleagues has acted on, or explored further, either of 
these concerns. In fact, apart from McLachlin J.’s invocation in that same 
case of Thomas Emerson’s description of expression as “an integral part 
of the development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation 
of self”,223 and the brief statement from Cory and Iacobucci JJ. in Zundel, 
we have been given very little in the way of general guidance on the 
Court’s understanding of self-realization in this context. To be fair to the 
Court, unlike in the case of democratic self-government, a value upon 
which, as we saw above, the Court has had occasion to comment at some 
length in other contexts, sources of guidance on the appropriate meaning 
to give self-realization within existing Canadian jurisprudence have been 
few and far between. To the best of my knowledge, self-realization as an 
independent value or principle has not been the subject of any meaning-
ful discussion by the Court in any other context. That said, the Court has 
discussed related concepts such as human dignity and liberty in other 
contexts, the former most notably in some of its judgments under section 
15 of the Charter224 and the latter in some of its judgments under sec-
tion 7.225 It has also addressed at some length the meaning of the more 
general concept of freedom in its freedom of religion jurisprudence.226  
To this point at least, however, the Court has not seen fit to draw on 
its treatment of those concepts in those other contexts for guidance in this 
one. All that we have from the Court is a collection of ad hoc assertions 
about the connection, or lack thereof, between particular kinds of expres-
sive activities and self-realization. And, as we will see, the Court has on 
the whole shown itself to be willing to protect virtually any interest an 
individual speaker or listener might wish to advance under the self-
realization rubric. However, as we will also see, the Court has evidenced 
a willingness to see some such interests as being more important than 
others, and hence to view certain kinds of expressive activity as being 
more helpful in the service of self-realization than others and therefore 
more deserving of protection. It has also shown itself to be attentive to 
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the question of whether or not the expressive activity in question in a 
given case is likely to produce a rational response on the part of the 
listener, and to offer less protection to that activity if the Court concludes 
that it is not. 
(a)  Commercial Expression 
Individual self-realization has played a particularly important role in 
the area of commercial expression, and it therefore makes sense to start 
this overview there. The focus of the Court’s attention in that area has 
been on the self-realization of members of the audience at which such 
expression has been directed — existing and potential consumers — 
rather than that of the speakers — the entities, usually corporations, 
doing the advertising. As noted above, the Court decided early on in 
Ford that commercial expression furthered the self-realization rationale 
because “[it] plays a significant role in enabling individuals to make 
informed economic choices, an important aspect of individual self-
fulfillment and personal autonomy”.227 That the Court should have 
interpreted the self-realization rationale to cover the making of informed 
economic choices was, of course, by no means inevitable. Regrettably, 
no explanation for that interpretation of it was given. One is left to 
presume that the Court saw merit in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1978 
decision in Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council,228 to which reference had earlier been made in its reasons, to 
reverse its previous position on the matter and give First Amendment 
protection to commercial expression, and do so on the same basis that 
our Court did. The fact that the First Amendment is found in a very 
different document than the Charter insofar as the protection of economic 
interests is concerned, was ignored. Nor was any meaningful considera-
tion given to the question of what striving to reach one’s potential as a 
member of a self-governing society might, and perhaps should — at least 
in the context of the Charter — mean. 
The holding was made in Ford at the definitional rather than section 
1 stage, but it meant that, when the Court came in later cases to rule on 
the permissibility of particular infringements on commercial expression 
at the section 1 stage, there was no need for it to consider whether or not 
commercial expression furthered the individual self-realization rationale; 
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that decision had already been made. Hence, in Rocket, McLachlin J. 
cited Ford in support of recognizing “advertising’s intrinsic value as 
expression, … and the importance of fostering informed economic 
choices to individual fulfillment and autonomy”.229 Since Ford, the Court 
has taken it as a given that the ability of consumers to make informed 
decisions about how to spend their money in the commercial marketplace 
is relevant to the achievement by them of their potential as human 
beings, and the evolution of their “vision of the good”. The only question 
for the Court in Rocket and the other later cases was the extent to which 
the specific kind of commercial expression at issue could be said to 
further those goals. 
The fact that the Court has focused on the self-realization interest of 
the listener in commercial expression cases can be explained in large part 
on the basis that, in most such cases, the speaker has been a corporation, 
an entity without the capacity to “self-realize”. However, in Rocket, the 
speakers were individual dentists, who clearly do have that capacity. 
Surprisingly, McLachlin J. still managed to dismiss their self-realization 
interest, on the basis that the impugned prohibition against advertising 
not only resulted in no “loss of opportunity to participate in the political 
process or the ‘marketplace of ideas’”, but also resulted in “[no loss of 
opportunity] to realize one’s spiritual or artistic self-fulfillment”.230 To 
the best of my knowledge, that is the only instance we have of the Court 
suggesting that its conception of self-realization might be constrained to 
certain spheres — here, the political, intellectual, spiritual and artistic 
spheres (on the assumption that the references to the political process and 
“marketplace of ideas” were intended to be aspects of the self-realization 
rationale). I am also unaware of any subsequent case in which this 
passage has been cited. 
It is worth noting that there is one case involving commercial expres-
sion in which the interests of the speaker were considered, and in fact, 
given greater weight than those of potential consumers. That case is the 
Prostitution Reference,231 in which the Court was asked to rule on the 
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validity inter alia of the prohibition against “communicating in a public 
place for the purpose of prostitution”. Chief Justice Dickson, who held 
the offence to be valid in spite of the limit it imposed on freedom of 
expression, did not, when he applied section 1, measure the speech at 
issue against all three of the rationales, as he had done in Keegstra, but 
he acknowledged that that speech did further the self-realization interest 
of the prostitute seeking customers, albeit to a limited extent: “It can 
hardly be said that communications regarding an economic transaction of 
sex for money lie at, or even near, the core of the guarantee of freedom of 
expression.”232  
One of the issues with which the Court has grappled in the context of 
commercial expression (among others) is whether or not, and, if so, to 
what extent, the fact that commercial expression is motivated by profit 
should affect the weight it is given in the balancing process under section 
1. The Court’s initial position was that it should, and that it should reduce 
the weight given it. That position was articulated in simple terms by 
McLachlin J. in Rocket when she addressed the question of how much 
weight to give to the interest of the dentist in being able to advertise his 
or her services: “[the dentist’s] loss, if prevented from [advertising], is 
merely loss of profit. …”.233 Justice Sopinka affirmed that position in 
Butler, when he said in support of assigning minimal weight to the 
freedom of expression interest of the producer of obscene material that 
“[the producer] is primarily economically motivated”.234 In RJR, how-
ever, the waters became muddied. Justice La Forest, in his dissenting 
reasons, adopted the position taken by McLachlin and Sopinka JJ. in the 
earlier cases and included the fact that “[t]he main, if not sole, motivation 
for [tobacco] advertising is, of course, profit” among the reasons for 
locating such advertising “far from the ‘core’ of freedom of expression 
values” and hence entitled to a very low degree of protection under 
section 1.235 Justice McLachlin, however, now objected to that view. 
After acknowledging that “this Court has stated that restrictions on 
commercial speech may be easier to justify than other infringements”, 
she then said that “no link between the claimant’s motivation and the 
degree of protection has been recognized”.236 She noted that “[b]ook 
sellers, newspaper owners, toy sellers — all are linked by their share-
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holders’ desire to profit from the corporation’s business activity …”, and 
then concluded that “motivation to profit is irrelevant”237 to the section 1 
analysis in section 2(b) cases. 
(b)  Hate Speech 
I turn now to the treatment accorded by the Court to the self-
realization rationale in areas outside the realm of commercial expression. 
The first of these is hate speech, in which the leading case remains Keeg-
stra. Chief Justice Dickson was quick to acknowledge in that case that the 
hate propaganda provision of the Criminal Code inhibits the ability of 
those whose expression it suppresses “to gain self-fulfillment by develop-
ing and articulating thoughts and ideas as they see fit”,238 and that to that 
extent that provision can be said to be inconsistent with this rationale for 
freedom of speech. But he was little troubled by that aspect of the provi-
sion because of the nature of the message being conveyed by such people, 
which he characterized as an assault on the interest in self-fulfillment of 
the members of the target groups. His reasoning ran as follows: 
On the other hand, such self-autonomy stems in large part from one’s 
ability to articulate and nurture an identity derived from membership in 
a cultural or religious group. The message put forth by individuals who 
fall within the ambit of s. 319(2) represents a most extreme opposition 
to the idea that members of identifiable groups should enjoy this aspect 
of the section 2(b) benefit. The extent to which the unhindered 
promotion of this message furthers free expression values must 
therefore be tempered insofar as it advocates with inordinate vitriol and 
intolerance and prejudice which view as execrable the process of 
individual self-development and human flourishing among all members 
of society.239  
It is unclear from this passage whether it is the likely or possible impact 
of the message that concerns Dickson C.J.C., or the content of the 
message alone. The wording of the two concluding sentences would 
seem to suggest that it is the latter, while the implication of the first 
sentence suggests that it is the former. The distinction is obviously an 
important one. The suppression of speech is much easier to justify, at 
least insofar as this rationale is concerned, if those seeking to justify it 
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need only show that the message being communicated can be said to 
challenge the right to self-development of the members of a particular 
group rather than being required to show that the impact of the message 
is likely to be that that right will in fact be impaired. 
Even with that issue left open, however, this application of the self-
fulfillment rationale fleshes out in important ways the Court’s under-
standing of its scope and meaning. It makes it clear that, at least in some 
contexts, the self-realization interest of parties other than the speaker and 
the listener — those about whom the speaker speaks — will be a relevant 
consideration. As Dickson C.J.C.’s analysis reveals, the protection of this 
interest is likely to argue for rather than, as in the case of the self-
realization interest of speakers and listeners, against the suppression of 
speech when the speech in question is held to harm the self-realization 
interest of those other parties. In that sense its inclusion not only expands 
but complicates the analysis, and does so in a way that, if Keegstra is to 
serve as a guide, obliges the Court in effect to prefer the interest in self-
realization of one group (the targets of the speech) over that of others 
(the speakers and listeners). On what basis that calculation is to be 
justified is not explained by Dickson C.J.C. 
But the significance of this passage in Dickson C.J.C.’s judgment 
goes beyond its impact on the analysis; it reaches into the Court’s under-
standing of the conditions under which the process of self-realization can 
best take place and, more generally, of the relationship between the 
individual and the group. At least for members of minority cultural and 
religious groups, Dickson C.J.C. implies, the ability to develop one’s 
potential as an individual is a function in part of the sense of identity, 
security and confidence that one is able to draw from one’s membership 
in those groups. To the extent that these groups are the targets of hatred, 
derision and prejudice, at the hands particularly of members of dominant 
groups, one is less likely to be able to rely on one’s membership in them 
for support, and to that extent the process of self-realization is made 
more difficult. The possibility of self-realization that freedom promises 
can be frustrated, therefore, not only by state-imposed constraints on that 
freedom but by the absence of a strong and reliable base within the 
community in which one lives from which to embark.  
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That same concern is evident in another case involving hate speech, 
Ross.240 Drawing on the above passage from Dickson C.J.C.’s judgment 
in Keegstra, La Forest J. said in reference to the self-realization rationale 
in the context of such speech that “expression that incites contempt for 
Jewish people on the basis of an ‘international Jewish conspiracy’ hinders 
the ability of Jewish people to develop a sense of self-identity and belong-
ing”.241 Interestingly, in that case, no mention was made of the self-
realization interest of either the speaker or his listeners. 
(c)  Obscenity 
The self-realization rationale has been important in the context of 
obscene speech, if only because, as we saw above in our discussion of 
the democratic self-government rationale, Sopinka J. held in Butler that it 
is the only rationale engaged by such speech. As he put it, such speech 
“appeals only to the most base aspect of individual fulfillment …”.242 No 
explanation was given for including the satisfaction of one’s sexual 
proclivities — even if it results in physical harm being caused to the 
other participants — in the list of activities covered under the self-
realization rubric. Moreover, the Court has said very little apart from that 
one observation about the value in that context. The only reference to 
self-realization in Little Sisters occurred in the context of Binnie J.’s 
summary of the argument of the challengers to the legislation there at 
issue, the provision in the Customs Tariff prohibiting the entry into 
Canada of obscene material, to the effect that homosexual erotica was 
linked to the self-fulfillment of gays and lesbians.243 (Justice Iacobucci 
invoked Voltaire’s description of “liberty of thought” as being “the life of 
the soul” in his dissent in that case,244 but he did not link that description 
directly to sexual material.)  
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(d)  Child Pornography 
While self-realization was given some attention in Sharpe, the com-
ments on it were limited in scope. In her majority reasons for judgment 
in that case, McLachlin C.J.C. said simply that “self-fulfillment” was the 
only one of the rationales engaged by the possession of child pornogra-
phy by adults, and added that “[s]ome question whether it engages even 
the value of self-fulfillment, beyond the base aspect of sexual exploita-
tion”.245 Later in her reasons, she gave more weight to the self-fulfillment 
rationale in the narrow context of young persons creating and possessing 
written and visual material satisfying the definition of child pornography 
and intended for their own personal use:  
Personal journals and writings, drawings and other forms of visual 
expression may well be of importance to self-fulfilment. Indeed, for 
young people grappling with issues of sexual identity and self-
awareness, private expression of a sexual nature may be crucial to 
personal growth and sexual maturation.246 
Justices L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and Bastarache agreed in their 
concurring reasons that “self-fulfillment” was the only value engaged by 
child pornography, but said that it was only engaged “in a limited sense 
since s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code in no way impedes positive self-
fulfillment” and, moreover, engages with it “at its most base and prurient 
level”.247 They also said that child pornography “hinders children’s own 
self-fulfillment and autonomous development by eroticizing their inferior 
social, economic and sexual status”.248 As occurred in Keegstra, one sees 
again in the latter statement the self-realization interest of persons other 
than the speaker and the listener (which, given the nature of the criminal 
prohibition in that case, could be said to be one and the same) coming to 
the fore, and providing a significant counterweight to that of the speaker 
and listener. 
(e)  Promotion of Leisure Activities 
In City of Montreal,249 the case in which the Court adopted an ap-
proach to access to public property claims in which the values underlying 
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freedom of expression play an important role, McLachlin C.J.C. and 
Deschamps J. held that music emanating from an exotic dancing club 
furthered the self-realization rationale. The reasoning relied upon to 
support that holding was as follows:  
Generally speaking, engaging in lawful leisure activities promotes such 
values as individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing. The 
disputed value of particular expressions of self-fulfillment, like exotic 
dancing, does not negate this general proposition.250  
The implication of this reasoning is that any and all expressive activities 
that can be said to encourage people to pursue a lawful leisure activity 
will be found to further the self-realization rationale, on the theory, one 
has to presume, that all lawful leisure activities will further that goal. 
Whether or not the Court will decide at some point that some leisure 
activities are more likely to further that goal than others, in the same way 
in which it has decided that some decisions made by consumers are more 
important to their self-realization than others, remains to be seen. The 
fact that McLachlin C.J.C. and Deschamps J. hedge the first of the 
propositions a bit by introducing it with “generally speaking” suggests 
that the Court might be open to doing that; so too, possibly, does their 
acknowledgement that the self-realization value of exotic dancing is 
contested. 
(f)  Employment-Related Speech 
Expressive activities related to a person’s employment have also been 
held to engage the self-realization rationale. Hence in KMart, which dealt 
with a ban on leafleting, Cory J. for the Court noted that, “for workers, a 
form of expression which deals with their working conditions and treat-
ment by their employer is a statement about their working environment. 
Thus it relates to their well-being and dignity in their workplace”.251 
Statements to the same effect can be found in the joint reasons for judg-
ment for the Court of McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. in a later case dealing 
with secondary picketing, Pepsi-Cola: “labour speech”, they said, “en-
gages the core values of freedom of expression, and is fundamental … to 
… the identity and self-worth of individual workers”.252 
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(g)  Consumer Expression 
In Guignard,253 the Court struck down a municipal by-law that pro-
hibited the use of advertising signs outside areas of the city zoned 
industrial. It did so in circumstances in which the by-law was being 
enforced against a consumer of insurance who was unhappy with the 
manner in which his insurer was handling an indemnity claim he had 
made on his policy and who expressed his unhappiness on a sign he 
placed on one of the commercial buildings that he owned in the city. 
While LeBel J. characterized the sign as a form of commercial expres-
sion, he clearly saw it as a special kind of such expression, which he 
labelled “counter-advertising”.254 And while he focused his discussion of 
the importance of such expression on the advancement of truth and 
knowledge rationale, he did say that it was “closely connected to the 
values underlying the protection of freedom of expression”,255 suggesting 
that it also furthers the self-realization rationale. 
(h)  The Political Process 
Participation in the political process can also safely be added to the 
list of expressive activities included in the Court’s conception of individ-
ual self-realization. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was quite explicit about the 
connection between the two in her concurring reasons for judgment in 
the Committee for the Commonwealth case, in which the expressive 
activity involved holding up placards and distributing leaflets promoting 
a community-based political organization: “political participation is 
valuable in part because it enhances personal growth and self-
realization.”256 And Gonthier J., in his dissenting reasons (but not on this 
point) in Thomson Newspapers,257 clearly saw participation in the politi-
cal process to be connected to this value. In the course of his application 
of section 1 to the legislation under attack in that case, which prohibited 
the publication of polls in the immediate run-up to an election, he said, 
“by allowing for full scrutiny of the information carried by poll results 
late in the election campaign, [the legislation] promotes voters’ self-
fulfillment by ensuring that the intention voters really want to convey in 
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casting their vote is actually expressed”.258 While these appear to be the 
only examples we have of members of the Court explicitly acknowledg-
ing the connection to this point, it is safe to assume that it would be 
accepted by all of them; to deny its inclusion when the consumption of 
commercial advertising and obscene material has been accepted would 
hardly make sense.  
(i)  What Is Not Included 
My research uncovered only two kinds of expressive activity that 
have been held not to further the cause of self-realization, and one of 
those holdings was made in a dissenting judgment (although not on this 
point). In Hill, and later again in Lucas, in both of which the Court was 
dealing with defamatory speech, Cory J. said that “[f]alse and injurious 
statements cannot enhance self-development”.259 That same view was 
expressed, albeit somewhat more equivocally, by McLachlin C.J.C. in 
Grant v. Torstar: she said that self-realization is of “dubious relevance” 
to defamatory speech “because the plaintiff’s interest in reputation may 
be just as worthy of protection as the defendant’s interest in self-
realization through unfettered expression”.260 Interestingly, she added 
that “Charter principles do not provide a licence to damage another 
person’s reputation simply to fulfill one’s atavistic desire to express 
oneself.”261 In their dissent in Zundel, which dealt with the “spreading 
false news” offence, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. expressed the view that  
[s]elf-fulfilment and human flourishing can never be achieved by the 
publication of statements known to be false. Rather the damaging false 
statements that are prohibited under s. 181 serve only to impede, in a 
most despicable and demeaning manner, the enjoyment of these values 
by members of society who are the subject of these lies.262  
Again, in both areas, we see evidence of the Court’s willingness to 
consider the self-realization interest of the targets of the speech com-
plained of. In fact, it is clear that in Zundel the analysis focused solely on 
the self-realization interest of those targets and ignored entirely that of 
the speaker and that of the listeners. No reason was given by Cory and 
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Iacobucci JJ. for ignoring the self-realization interest of the speaker and 
listeners, and, it has to be said, it is difficult to fashion one that would 
justify doing so. It is also difficult to see how, once the self-realization 
interest of the speaker is taken into account, speech of the nature consid-
ered in these cases could not be said to further at least that interest.263 The 
status of speech of this nature in relation to this rationale must therefore 
be said to be unclear. 
(j)  The Role of Rationality 
The role of rationality in the Court’s assessment of restrictions on 
expressive activities furthering the self-realization rationale first became 
evident in Irwin Toy,264 which followed closely on the heels of Ford. 
Unlike in many of the later section 2(b) cases, the Court did not measure 
the commercial expression at issue in that case — the advertising of 
products to children — against the three rationales, but it did shed some 
indirect light on its thinking about the self-realization rationale when in 
the course of its section 1 analysis it examined the objective that the 
government of Quebec had been seeking to further when it enacted the 
impugned legislation. That purpose, the Court said, was to protect young 
children from “[their] particular susceptibility ... to media manipulation, 
their inability to differentiate between reality and fiction and to grasp the 
persuasive intention behind the message”, as well as to minimize “the 
secondary effects of exterior influences on the family and parental 
authority”.265 What is significant for current purposes about this aspect of 
the Court’s section 1 analysis is the willingness it evidenced to accept 
both that much commercial advertising is manipulative — at one point 
the decision speaks of “the techniques of seduction and manipulation 
abundant in advertising”266 — and that many of those at whom such 
advertising is aimed, particularly but not only children, fall prey to such 
techniques. By accepting that commercial advertising can manipulate 
people, the Court was acknowledging that human beings do not always 
respond to speech in a rational — in the sense of thoughtful and delibera-
tive — manner. At the same time, the Court appeared to be questioning 
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the co-relation between commercial advertising and the self-realization 
of those at whom it is aimed. In Ford, it will be recalled, commercial 
speech was said to deserve constitutional protection because it “plays a 
significant role in enabling individuals to make informed economic 
choices …”,267 clearly implying that the choices would be rational ones. 
The decision in Irwin Toy suggests not only that that connection pre-
sumes that the choices being made are rational ones — and not choices 
induced by “seduction and manipulation” — but also that the applicabil-
ity and strength of the connection can vary from context to context 
depending on the extent to which the assumption of rationality can be 
said to be valid. 
That theme is also evident in Rocket.268 There, McLachlin J. repeated 
the concern about manipulation in the context of advertising by dentists: 
“Consumers of dental services”, she said, “would be highly vulnerable to 
unregulated advertising. As non-specialists, they would lack the ability to 
evaluate competing claims as to the quality of different dentists.”269 And 
that concern, it should be noted, played an important role in the fashioning 
of the Court’s decision in that case. The Court held that the impugned 
regulation failed the proportionality test because it prohibited advertising 
about hours of operation and languages spoken, matters in respect of which 
the concern about manipulation would not apply and the assumption of 
rationality would be valid.  
RJR270 provides further evidence of this kind of thinking, although 
more obliquely. Of the informational and brand preference advertising 
caught by the federal Tobacco Products Control Act,271 McLachlin J. said 
that it provided consumers of tobacco products with “an important means 
of learning about product availability to suit their preferences and to 
compare brand content with an aim to reducing the risk to their 
health”.272 That assessment of the character of such advertising, and its 
likely effect, was clearly based on the assumption that consumers would 
respond rationally to it, and I think it is reasonable to suggest that that 
assumption played into her conclusion that the ban was unlikely to have 
any effect on the overall consumption of tobacco products, and hence 
was unconstitutional. She was not prepared to make the same assump-
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tion, however, when she came to deal with lifestyle advertising and 
advertising aimed at children, which were also caught by the ban. These 
she willingly accepted were likely to increase consumption, and hence 
were fair game for a government prohibition.  
Finally in this regard, mention should be made of Canada v. JTI-
Macdonald,273 the case in which the Court was asked to review  
the legislation that Parliament had enacted in response to its decision in 
RJR. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the Court, upheld all of the  
impugned prohibitions — against false promotion, advertising and 
promotion appealing to young persons, lifestyle advertising and sponsor-
ships — and her reasons in support of doing so made frequent reference 
to the vulnerability of consumers to manipulation at the hands of tobacco 
manufacturers. Hence, in her assessment of the prohibition against 
advertising to young persons, she said that “the vulnerability of the 
young may justify measures that privilege them over adults in matters of 
free expression”,274 and in reviewing the prohibition against lifestyle 
advertising, she referred to the “subtle subliminal evocations” that the 
manufacturers sought to convey in their commercials.275 It seems clear 
that, from the Court’s standpoint, the greater the likelihood that consum-
ers will be manipulated by the advertiser, the more tenuous the connec-
tion between the advertising in question and the self-realization rationale 
will be, and the easier it will be for the government to justify its infring-
ing legislation.276 
I am not aware of any case in which the Court has addressed the 
question of whether or not expression that cannot be said to be manipu-
lative but that elicits an emotional rather than rational response should, 
on that basis, receive a lower level of protection. Butler could have raised 
that question, but there is nothing in either Sopinka J. or Gonthier J.’s 
reasons for judgment in that case to suggest that they saw it as having 
done so. The question — clearly an important one from the standpoint of 
both practice and theory — therefore remains very much an open one. 
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(k)  Varying Contributions to Self-Realization 
Rocket277 is important for another reason as well. Justice McLachlin 
made it clear that in her view the weight to be given to the freedom of 
expression interest in that case had to be greater than the weight given to 
it in Irwin Toy because the interest of patients in being able to make an 
informed choice about who their dentist is going to be is more important 
than the interest of children in knowing about which toys are available 
for purchase. Putting it in the language of self-realization, advertising by 
dentists, at least about such matters as hours of operation and languages 
spoken, was seen to promote that self-realization to a greater degree than 
advertising by toy manufacturers. She repeated that line of argument in 
RJR278 when she discussed the weight to be given to what she there 
termed informational advertising by the manufacturers of tobacco 
products. Referring back to her reasons in Rocket, she noted that infor-
mational advertising by dentists “might have benefited consumers and 
contributed to their health”, and then added, “The same may be said 
here.”279 The implication of that reasoning is clearly that not all choices 
affected by the advertising of goods and services will be considered to be 
of equal importance. Some choices will be considered to be of greater 
importance than others, and hence some kinds of advertising will be 
given greater protection than others. It is worth noting that no justifica-
tion for the distinctions made by McLachlin J. in Rocket and RJR was 
offered; they were simply asserted. 
The fact that the Court in cases like Butler280 and Sharpe281 has de-
scribed the value to consumers of obscene speech and child pornography 
in terms of “the most base aspect of self-fulfillment” evidences a similar 
willingness to attach more weight to some self-realizing interests than 
others. In neither case did the Court seek to compare the indulgence of a 
person’s sexual proclivities with any other such interests, so we have no 
guidance as to exactly where on the scale that interest falls. But the 
language of “most base” suggests that the Court sees it as ranking very 
low on the list of self-realizing activities. Again, no basis was provided 
for assigning such a low ranking to this kind of expression; it was simply 
asserted. 
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How a court would go about the difficult task of rationalizing such 
distinctions if it decided to tackle that task is far from clear. Presumably 
the justification would have to be expressed in terms of the differing 
contributions particular kinds of choices make to human well-being, with 
choices that have a bearing on critically important interests such as 
physical security, health and intellectual development ranking at or near 
the top and those that relate to hedonistic leisure activities at or near the 
bottom. Whatever the justification proffered, these distinctions are bound 
to be controversial. 
(l)  Summary 
The Court has declined to offer a comprehensive conception of the 
goal of individual self-realization that it has included as one of the 
three rationales underlying section 2(b) of the Charter. It seems clear, 
however, that the conception on the basis of which it appears to be 
operating is a very generous one: it has held that the rationale protects 
commercial expression, hate speech, obscenity, child pornography, 
promotion of leisure activities, employment-related speech, consumer 
expression and participation in the political process. It has also made it 
clear that this rationale is concerned with the self-realization interest 
not only of speakers and listeners, but also of those about whom the 
speaker speaks. The only kinds of expression that can be said to be of 
dubious status in relation to this rationale reflect this feature of the 
Court’s understanding — false defamatory statements and other false-
hoods that harm the self-realization interests of third parties. As with 
the other two rationales, not all expression protected by this one is 
entitled to the same degree of protection; the factors the Court consid-
ers relevant to determining the appropriate degree of protection for a 
particular expressive activity include the extent to which that activity 
can be expected to elicit a rational response from listeners and the 
extent to which that activity can be said to contribute to the self-
realization interest of the speaker and others. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the Supreme Court of Canada could have provided a much 
more considered basis than it has done for selecting democratic self-
government, the advancement of truth and knowledge and individual 
(2012), 59 S.C.L.R. (2d) PROTECTING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 511 
self-realization as the philosophical rationales for freedom of expression 
in the Charter, it is clear that these values have now taken firm root in the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to section 2(b). It is also clear that 
they have been assigned a broad range of doctrinal roles by the Court, 
and that they have therefore become one of the mix of factors that courts 
have to take into account in the resolution of many if not most cases in 
which freedom of expression is invoked.  
To this point, the Court has shown no interest in exploring the mean-
ing of any of these values in a careful and considered manner. It has 
preferred instead to proceed on an ad hoc, case by case basis, saying as 
little as it feels it can about the connection between each of them and the 
particular kind of expressive activity at issue in each case in order to 
ensure that the doctrinal role in question has been adequately fulfilled — 
and that has often been very little. That preference has obviously  
detracted from the Court’s ability to explore the existence and nature of 
such connections in a conceptually coherent and systematic manner, and 
therefore to provide a theoretically convincing foundation for the conclu-
sions it reaches. It has not, however, prevented the Court from shedding 
important light on what it understands each of the values to mean. In 
fact, given the large number of section 2(b) cases the Court has already 
been called upon to decide, it is possible to extract a reasonably detailed 
picture of the Court’s understanding of each of them. And, as we have 
seen, those pictures suggest that the Court understands all three of them 
to be quite extensive in reach, and therefore to catch a very broad range 
of expressive activities. That is particularly true of the third, individual 
self-realization, which may well have no limits. But those pictures also 
suggest that those understandings are quite nuanced, with the strength of 
the connection between particular expressive activities and each of the 
values varying from context to context. The factors relevant to making 
such assessments are themselves varied, and can include considerations 
such as whether the expressive activity is likely to elicit a rational or 
non-rational response, whether the expressive activity threatens the value 
of equality, whether the expressive activity is integral or only loosely 
related to the value, and where the expressive activity takes place. 
The next step in the process is, of course, to subject the Court’s under-
standing of these values to critical scrutiny. An important part of that 
second step will be to examine the values from a broader perspective than 
the Court has so far been willing to do. The starting point for that examina-
tion will be the approach taken to them by one of the leading American 
free speech scholars, Frederick Schauer, in his book Free Speech: A 
512 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2012), 59 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Philosophical Enquiry, not because that approach is necessarily the right 
one, but because it provides a useful vantage point from which to assess 
the Court’s approach. But all of that awaits a second paper. 
 
 
